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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Three Types of Regulators 
Recasting prevailing conceptions of regulation and restructuring 
them around three distinct prototypes of regulators, this Article offers a 
new conceptualization of public regulation.1  I name the three prototypes 
“the Guardian,” “the Facilitator,” and “the Technician.”  Each type 
weaves some of administrative regulation's key features into a coherent, 
expansive, conceptual map, providing a wide context for evaluating 
regulatory enterprises. 
Through a comprehensive study of (both legal and non-legal) 
literature on federal regulation from the late nineteenth century until the 
present, this Article identifies, introduces, and systematically explores a 
triptych of regulators that comprise the U.S. administrative state. 
Furthermore, it argues that when scholars analyze the modern 
phenomenon of public regulation, their work embeds the three types of 
regulators, even if the authors themselves do not acknowledge it.  
Demonstrating this typology's pervasiveness and tenacity throughout the 
 
 1. While economic regulation is the focus of this study, at some points it will touch upon 
forms of administrative activity less commonly referred to as “regulation,” such as the award of 
welfare benefits.  In any event, the governmental activity discussed in this Article is carried out by 
specialized public bodies:  administrative agencies.  See generally Robert A. Kagan, Regulators and 
Regulatory Processes, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 212, 219-23 (Austin 
Sarat ed., 2004).  In this discussion, “commissions,” “agencies,” “tribunals,” and similar terms 
should be regarded as synonymous, along the lines of the expansive definition of “agency” in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000).  Moreover, throughout the 
discussion I do not address the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication, which is a key 
feature of the APA.  I refrain from heeding the distinction based on the following observation:  “Our 
existing models of administrative law have largely developed in response to a single method of 
regulation:  the command method.”  Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 454 (2003) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Stewart, Twenty-First 
Century].  So viewed, rulemaking and adjudication are two facets of the (single) command method. 
See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of Uniform Standards 
and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1267 n.2 (1985).  It should be 
added, finally, that the command system has been under fierce attack for a while now.  For surveys 
of critiques of the command system, see, for example, Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental 
Regulation:  The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
103, 103-18 (1998), and Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/3
8_SAGY_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOC 2/22/20112:13 PM 
2011] A TRIPTYCH OF REGULATORS 427 
intellectual history of federal regulation, this Article suggests it is part of 
a collective unconscious shared by students of regulation. 
Indeed, throughout the history of U.S. administrative regulation, 
commentators have rarely consciously grappled with different 
perceptions of the administrative regulator.2  This deficiency is 
symptomatic of administrative-law scholarship, where very little is 
explicitly said of the officials who occupy the halls of administrative 
agencies,3 but much is told about their handiwork.  This Article wishes 
to fill this serious gap in the literature by introducing, for the first time, a 
comprehensive typology of American administrative regulators. 
The essentials of the tripartite typology are the following.  The 
Guardian prototype is modeled on an image of a statesperson.  It is an 
executory figure, a pragmatic official, who “possesses a broad 
understanding of men and affairs.”4  Her métier lies in her leadership, 
initiative, and analytical and social skills; her mission is to shepherd a 
distressed community to Arcadia.  Think here of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator's powers under the Clean Air 
Act (CAA)5 to identify “air pollutants,” publish consonant air quality 
criteria, and regularly revisit national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS) for air pollutants.6 
The Facilitator, much like a psychotherapist, assumes a suggestive 
role.  Her aspiration is modest but profound, namely, to provide a 
platform for an informed and open communal contemplation whereby a 
baffled public can realize what lies in its best interest.  EPA-made 
Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), to be adopted by private 
organizations, present a case in point:  EMSs are sets of procedures, 
 
 2. There are notable exceptions, such as E. PENDLETON HERRING, FEDERAL 
COMMISSIONERS:  A STUDY OF THEIR CAREERS AND QUALIFICATIONS (1936); Harold J. Laski, The 
Limitations of the Expert, 162 HARPER’S MONTHLY MAG. 101 (1930); Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion 
of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973).  
 3. The focus of the Article is public regulation.  I will therefore speak of regulators, 
administrators, and bureaucrats interchangeably, following Justice Breyer’s observation that “all 
regulation is characterized by administration through bureaucracy.”  STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 6 (1982). 
 4. HERRING, supra note 2, at 90-91. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7626 (1994). 
 6. This procedure is outlined in §§ 108-109 of CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994), and 
Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1135-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  On the NAAQS in 
general, see Alaska Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469-74 (2004); Robert W. 
Adler, Integrated Approach to Water Pollution:  Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 203, 230-50 (1999); ROY S. BELDEN, CLEAN AIR ACT 11-21 (2001). See also infra text 
accompanying notes 244-250 (further discussion of the NAAQS). 
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whose aim is to instill environmentally-conscious thinking in 
organizations.7 
The Technician is a skilled practitioner, qualified by certified 
training or formal experience, whose task is to apply a specific body of 
knowledge to a given situation.  Although executory in nature, her 
sphere of operation is always limited.  Turning once again to the field of 
environmental regulation, the Clean Water Act (CWA)8 provides an 
example of a Technician-led regulatory scheme.  It establishes a national 
permit program, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES).9  This program is straightforward:  “Under NPDES, all 
facilities which discharge pollutants from any point source into waters of 
the United States are required to obtain a permit”10 either directly from 
the EPA or from states authorized to do so by the EPA.11 
To be sure, there is nothing abnormal in the plurality of prototypes 
that underlie the EPA’s various duties.  Different types regularly cohabit 
under the roof of one agency.12  Taken together, the three types cover the 
full gamut of officials in the U.S. administrative apparatus.13  Normally, 
 
 7. On EMSs, see generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1275-87 (1995); PHILIP J. STAPLETON & MARGARET A. GLOVER, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:  AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE 
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2001).  For further discussion of the EMSs, see also infra notes 219-224 
and accompanying text. 
 8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). 
 9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).  See also EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 
426 U.S. 200, 205-08 (1976) (analysis of Section 402); infra note 11 and text accompanying notes 
263-266 (further discussion of the NPDES). 
 10. OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER 
PERMITTING 101 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/101pape.pdf. 
 11. Although the program was introduced with the understanding that the lion’s share of 
permits would be handled by the states, NPDES belabored—and still does—the EPA with the 
formidable task of issuing and re-issuing a very large number of permits.  See 1 WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  AIR AND WATER 373-87, 445 (1986).  See also E.I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, Administrator, EPA, 430 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1977); NRDC v. Costle, 
568 F.2d 1369, 1380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“We are and must be sensitive to [the] EPA’s concern of 
an intolerable permit load.”).  According to the EPA website, forty-seven States are approved to 
issue NPDES permits.  See NPDES State Program Status, EPA (last updated Apr. 14, 2003 1:58 
PM), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm. 
 12. See IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:  TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 31-34 (1992), and Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1811 (1991) (noting with regard to the various programs 
included in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408 et seq. (1994), “[e]ach of 
these programs is tailored to the problem it seeks to address, and each is quite different in its 
approach.”).  Representative Waxman, the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee's Subcommittee on Health and Environment at the time, “was a central architect” of the 
Amendments.  Id. at 1721 n.*. 
 13. Administrative Law Judges may be one exception to this generalization, as, due to their 
abnormal (independent) position within the administrative apparatus, it is indeed difficult to classify 
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the Technician is distinctly a lower-level official, while the Guardian 
and the Facilitator prototypes are embodied in high-ranking officials, 
typically heads of the agencies.  In the course of the discussion, I 
highlight additional dissimilarities between the three types with regard to 
such central issues as administrators’ degree of independence, scope of 
reputed competence, span of discretion, characteristic procedures and 
remedies, as well as their source of legitimacy, use of information, and 
the “kinds” of power they exercise. 
It should already be clear that, rather than going down the essential, 
yet well-trodden path of case-law digest, this study takes the analysis 
one step “deeper” in the sense that it exposes and describes a previously-
unnoticed, extended intellectual tradition shared by lawyers, judges, and 
legal (and other) scholars.14  Specifically, this Article shows how the 
work of fin de siècle Progressive theoretician and regulator Charles 
Francis Adams, one of the forefathers of the Facilitator types, resonates 
with current strategies to “reinvent” the administrative process;15 how 
theories laid down by the legendary New Deal lawyer and regulator 
James Landis inform beginning-of-the-twenty-first-century descriptions 
of the Guardian by Justice Stephen Breyer;16 and finally, how early-
twentieth-century analyses of administration by political scientists who 
sought to found a “science of administration” parallel current 
formulations of the Technician type.17 
In combining past and present perspectives, this Article makes an 
important contribution to the literature:  by isolating the three general 
prototypes pervading the literature, it introduces a greater degree of 
theoretical precision to the understanding of public regulation, and goes 
on to demonstrate how current regulatory schemes can be better 
understood using the triad of prototypes.  This Article also suggests why 
we can expect these types to persist in future public regulation.  At the 
 
them under the Article’s tripartite scheme.  See generally STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 713-18 (6th ed. 2006). 
 14. Indeed, the Article has a descriptive orientation.  This did not prevent me from generally 
disregarding the difficult distinction between authors’ descriptive and prescriptive formulations in 
making observations regarding their underlying approaches to regulation.  After all, description and 
prescription are often blended in the literature, even more so in works that use ideal types in the 
analysis (such as this one).  See, e.g., Jody Freeman and Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental 
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 804-05 (2005); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE 1-4 (1997).  See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
57, 59-60 n.8 (1984); Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure:  A Welfarist Theory of 
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 245-47, 268 (2000).  
 15. See infra Sections II.A. & IV.A. 
 16. See infra Section II.B. & IV.B. 
 17. See infra Section II.C. & IV.C. 
5
Sagy: A Triptych of Regulators
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
8_SAGY_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOC 2/22/20112:13 PM 
430 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:425 
same time, this Article joins and contributes to the study of the 
intellectual history of U.S. regulation by identifying deep undercurrents 
running throughout that history. 
B. Methodology, Sources, Structure 
The archetypes are three theoretical complexes.18  They are 
construed in an ideal-type fashion,19 based on a review of a broad, yet 
specialized body of literature that scrutinizes various facets of public 
regulation.  The types are not “just” isolated metaphors, but rather 
conceptual maps20 that cover an array of issues in the world of 
regulation and provide different meanings to organs’ actions within that 
world.21 
The database informing the investigation is expansive and 
heterogeneous, but not limitless, of course.  The analysis draws on 
sources that were produced, roughly, during the past century and a half, 
 
 18.  See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:  
HOBBES TO LOCKE 46-49 (1962).  See also infra note 19.  Admittedly, one of the dangers in using 
such models is that they are liable to create the impression of constancy over time, if not of the 
models’ immutability throughout the decades.  For the analysis’s novelty and scope, I am hopeful 
that in this case the advantages outweigh the disadvantages in this methodology. 
 19. Legal scholarship is no stranger to ideal-type analysis.  See notably Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 30 DUKE L.J. 181 (1981); 
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1281-82 
(1984); Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40-41, 55-56 (1997).  On Weber”s ideal-type methodology, see 1 MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 19-22, 215-16 (Guenther Roth & Clauss Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoffet 
al. trans., 1978).  See also Donald McIntosh, The Objective Bases of Max Weber’s Ideal Types, 16 
HIST. & THEORY 265 (1977); Susan J. Hekman, Weber’s Ideal Type:  A Contemporary 
Reassessment, 16 POLITY 119 (1983); ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY:  LEGAL THEORY 
IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 134-59 (1995).  Admittedly, ideal-type analysis is often conducted 
in concert with a broad historical study.  For lack of space and theoretical clarity, I do not conduct 
historical analysis here, though I begin to do it elsewhere.  See Yair Sagy, The Manager, The Judge, 
and the Empiricist:  American Administrative Law as a Theory of Expertise (2006) (unpublished 
JSD Dissertation, NYU) (on file with the NYU Law School Library). 
 20. I borrow this term from STEVEN LUKES, POWER:  A RADICAL VIEW 15 (2d ed. 2005). 
 21. To state the obvious, the analysis has inescapably involved interpretation.  This is the case 
in virtually every academic work, even more so in works that use ideal types in the analysis.  See 
sources cited supra note 14.  As noted, rarely have scholars openly addressed notions of 
administrative regulators.  Still, having the research question at hand in mind, a previously-out-of-
sight, yet distinct pattern has emerged in the germane literature—starting with administrative law 
theory must-reads, such as JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) and STEPHEN 
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); and 
seminal works in political science and organization theory, such as Professor Woodrow Wilson, The 
Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887) and MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING 
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955).  As I examined more and more sources, focusing 
on sources commonly cited to this day, my understanding of the pattern was further refined, 
resulting in the present delineation of the three types of administrators. 
6
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and whose focal point is the modern phenomenon of federally-
orchestrated public regulation.  Discipline-wise, this corpus is not 
confined to legal literature.  Rather, the following analysis draws heavily 
on the writings of prominent political scientists, economists, 
organization theorists, and historians alongside the works of leading 
administrative-law theoreticians, thus presenting an integrated field of 
public-regulation scholarship.22 
This Article unfolds in five parts.  The next Part (Part II) outlines 
the prototypes’ main features (their general function, scope of discretion, 
and main tools of regulation), thus laying out the basis for the ensuing 
discussion.  Next, Part III is dedicated to a critical examination of the 
types.  Special attention is given to the following aspects of public 
regulation:  failures in regulators’ handling of information; the 
interactions between politics and regulation; modalities of power 
(couched in Foucauldian terms) regulators exert on other members of 
society; legitimacy concerns associated with regulators’ ordering of 
public affairs; and organizational considerations.23 
Part IV focuses particularly on the present and on contemporary 
schemes of regulation.  It illustrates how the three types are manifested 
in current regulatory schemes.  This Part draws most of its examples 
from the ongoing campaign to reinvent environmental regulation as well 
as from the fields of occupational and food safety.  Following the 
theoretical exposé in Part III and the analysis of on-the-ground 
regulatory schemes embodying the types in Part IV, Part V integrates the 
 
 22. This presentation deliberately conceals an important parallel story about the complicated 
relationship between legal and non-legal approaches to public administration.  See generally Robert 
A. Katzmann, Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory:  Changing Bureaucratic 
Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980); Keith Whittington, Crossing Over:  Citation of 
Public Law Faculty in Law Reviews, 14 LAW & COURTS 5 (2004).  Cf. Barry Friedman, The Politics 
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (comparing lawyers’ and political scientists’ 
conceptions of judicial review).  In a word, it is a story of persistent mutualignorance throughout 
most of the history of federal regulation.  Parts of the story are told in Sagy, supra note 19.  The last 
generation of scholars has witnessed a growing sensitivity to disciplinary parochialism, but it is 
clear that here, too, old habits die hard.  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and 
Economics—And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 347 (1988) (“American 
administrative law remains a court-centered field . . . .”), and Richard B. Stewart, U.S. 
Administrative Law:  A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 63, 72 
(2005).  For calls on scholars and judges to be mindful of what administrative processes really look 
like, see Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1990); 
Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park:  Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative 
Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1254-55, 1329 (1992); Steven P. Croley, 
Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-31 
(1998). 
 23. On the considerations leading to the selection of these axes of analysis, see infra text 
accompanying note 105. 
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research findings into one comprehensive framework, allowing for an 
informed, critical evaluation of the three types “in-action.”  Finally, Part 
VI concludes. 
II.  TYPES OF REGULATORS 
This Part will provide an elaborated description of the types.  The 
prototypes may be best introduced by referring to the list of relevant 
features, shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1:  GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE TYPES 
 
 Facilitator Guardian Technician 
Function:  
Generally 
Advisory 
judgment; 
convener
Overall-
execution; 
managerial
Objective and 
efficient task-
execution
Scope of 
Discretion 
Limited Widest Purportedly none 
Leading Tools 
of 
Regulation 
Information; 
negotiation; 
collaboration 
Command-
and-
Control; 
formulation 
of policy
Permit; voucher; 
monitoring; 
bookkeeping 
 
A. The Facilitator 
1.  Synopsis 
The setting stipulated by this type is of an agitated society, ready 
for action, but lacking a roadmap—a map which is surely “out there,” 
waiting to be unfolded once all the facts are set in order.  Herein lies the 
need for this type of commissioner:  she facilitates public action by 
providing civic fora where fact-gathering and fact-processing 
mechanisms are employed, so the community is able to see for itself the 
causes of and remedies for a given public menace.  Under this scheme, 
the regulator’s intervention is necessary, but not sufficient, to bring 
about “actual” regulation.  It is principally for the various (private) 
groups of society, rather than the Facilitator-commissioner alone, to 
carry out the needed regulatory agenda—if they so choose.  The type’s 
general suspicion of direct state regulation and strong belief in the merits 
8
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of private action is coupled with the conviction that, conducted in this 
fashion, regulation is likely to serve a unified public interest. 
2.  Bureau of Statistics 
The clearest presentation of the Facilitator type was made more 
than a century ago by a Progressive Bostonian by the name of Charles 
Francis Adams, Jr.24  As we shall see,25 the work of this early 
theoretician very much resonates with contemporary theories. 
Adams, a keen student of the day’s burgeoning railroad industry, 
observed early on that as previously remote localities drew closer with 
the coming of railways, a one-directional movement was certain to 
evolve.  This movement would encompass food and commodities, men 
and nations, ideas and artifacts:  “The tendency of steam has universally 
been towards the gravitation of the parts to the centre,—towards the 
combination and concentration of forces, whether intellectual or 
physical.”26  According to Adams, the gravitational movement 
manifested itself not only in the modern configuration of the industrial 
world,27 but also, concurrently, in the sphere of public governance.  “To 
succeed,” he declared, “centralization is necessary; diffusion insures 
 
 24. Adams was born in 1835 and died in 1915.  CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 1835-1915, AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1916) [hereinafter ADAMS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY].  He emerged on the public 
scene first as a Progressive muckraker who bitterly criticized the railroad barons of the time for their 
corruption.  See notably Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie, in CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 
JR., & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-99 (1871) [hereinafter Adams, 
Chapter of Erie].  Important for our purposes, Adams was the founding father and consequently the 
Chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Railroads Commissioners, created in 1869 by an act 
authored by Adams himself.  The following discussion will reveal the key features of the 
Commission.  ADAMS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra, at 178.  The Massachusetts Board became a 
“national prototype” at the end of the nineteenth century and went down in history as a “sunshine” 
commission employing a form of “weak” (i.e., purely advisory) regulation.  See THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 1-57 (1984).  See also ADAMS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra; 
EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 1835-1915:  THE PATRICIAN AT BAY (1965). 
For a fuller analysis and contextualization of Adams’ work, see Sagy, supra note 19, ch. 5. On 
Progressivism and muckrakers, see, for example, ROBERT H. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM:  
A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT:  
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003). 
 25. See infra Section IV.A. 
 26. Charles Francis Adams, The Railroad System, 104 N. AM. REV. 476, 484 (April, 1867) 
[hereinafter Adams, Railroad System]. 
 27. Adams championed combinations among railroads.  He thought that “[c]ombinations of 
capital and labor which amount to monopolies can alone satisfy the present enormous requirements 
of modern society.”  Id. at 502. 
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failure.  This principle applies as well to the labors of commissioners as 
to the material efforts of individuals.”28 
Adams’s works instantly reveal that, in his eyes, he was engaged in 
a missionary cause.  Adams the Progressive was sorrowed and driven to 
action by “the deep decay which has eaten into our social edifice.”29  It is 
for this reason that he did not put much stock on legislative remedies 
offered in vauco, that is, on measures not backed by a committed 
public.30  Adams’s various publications aimed to bring about public 
awakening.  He labored for a credible exposure of the far-ranging 
repercussions of, and interests involved in, the spread of railways around 
the globe, holding that before any form of action could be taken, “the 
first preliminary [was] to induce the community to realize the true 
magnitude of the question involved.”31 
The vehicles to be employed for that end were “[c]ommissons—
advisory bureaus”; they “might scientifically study and disclose to an 
astonished community . . . the remedies no less than the causes of 
obstructions.”32  The advantages that might follow from this course of 
action would be enormous and sweeping.  It “might go far to remedy an 
especial inherent defect in all representative governments,” and put an 
end to useless rant of Legislatures and various public committees, thus 
“introduc[ing] order into . . . chaos.”33 
The proposal is to supplant an erratic and centrifugal regime based 
on biased and fragmented data with a centripetal order run by a reliable, 
competent, and permanent body, backed by a concentration of social 
forces.34  This body would yield scientific, i.e., objective and 
indisputable, data, which would serve as a platform for an informed 
“open discussion” about pending social problems impeding prosperity.35  
Such a discussion, in turn, is projected to bring about much-needed 
solutions to these problems.  This problem-tackling procedures’ 
potential emanates from Adams’s conviction that, while the public may 
 
 28. Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 106 N. AM. REV. 1, 19 (1868) [hereinafter Adams, 
Boston I]. 
 29. Adams, Chapter of Erie, supra note 24, at 94. 
 30. See id. at 98. 
 31. Adams, Railroad System, supra note 26, at 480. 
 32. Adams, Boston I, supra note 28, at 16. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Charles Francis Adams, Boston II, 106 N. AM. REV. 557, 558 (April, 1868) 
(“Wielding all the influence of a community, having every source of information thrown open to 
them, such officials [i.e., commission members] become the recipients of light from all quarters, and 
can, if they be competent, concentrate the scattered rays into a powerful focus.”). 
 35. Adams, Boston I, supra note 28, at 18, 25. 
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seem fragmented or even torn apart, upon reflection and under the 
Facilitator’s direction, it turns out that the public interest is unified.  It is 
this single interest that is identified in the regulatory process. 
These are, then, the essentials of the theory of regulation with 
which Adams was most associated, a theory that bespeaks the Facilitator 
prototype.  First, information is key to success:  “When such a bureau 
[of railroads statistics] exists, and not till then, may some intelligent 
railroad legislation be hoped for.”36  Second, Adams-style regulation was 
indeed in the style of “weak,” non-intrusive regulation.  A staunch 
believer in the “the eventual supremacy of an enlightened public 
opinion,” Adams was certain that once such a commission was 
established, “all else might safely be left to take its own course.”37 
Finally, Adams insisted that the Massachusetts Railroad Board 
members would be left “[w]ithout remedial or corrective power[s]”38 for 
yet another reason.  He thought it would create the condition necessary 
for them to win the confidence of all sides of a controversy, railroads, of 
course, included.  Adams, who would call for the legalization of 
“regulated combination,”39 took pride in the fact that “the railroad 
corporations have never appeared in opposition to [the Massachusetts 
Railroads Board] as a body.”40  This user-friendly attitude goes hand in 
hand with the Facilitator type, which is premised on a joint-venture 
modus operandi.  It also falls in line with Adams’s general negative 
disposition to government intervention in the private sphere, as he 
declared in 1867:  “It is rapidly becoming throughout the world—and 
the more rapidly the better—a cardinal principle of polity, that the more 
the functions of government can be reduced, the better.”41 
B. The Guardian 
1.  Synopsis 
In many respects, things are clearer with the Guardian archetype as 
compared to the Facilitator.  The division of labor between regulatory 
bodies and the public under this scheme is simpler and leaves little room 
for public hesitation.  The Guardian introduces regulation after a 
sufficiently large part of the public has decided that (a) something needs 
 
 36. Adams, Railroad System, supra note 26, at 498 n.*. 
 37. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, RAILROADS:  THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS 140, 215 (1878). 
 38. Id. at 143. 
 39. Id. at 187.  See also supra note 27. 
 40. ADAMS, supra note 37, at 143. 
 41. Adams, Railroad System, supra note 26, at 508. 
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to be done about a certain problem (b) by the government.  In other 
words, the model assumes, if not takes for granted, the high probability 
of public intervention in the private sphere.  With that view in mind, the 
regulator's discretion is sketched in broad strokes; she is often granted 
inquisitorial, executory, and enforcement powers.  It is as if once the 
public regards a problem as worthy of state intervention, the Guardian is 
asked to “deal with it,” or simply “make it go away.” 
The Guardian is a leader.  She should explicate the problem to be 
addressed to the public, but even more so she details what must be done 
in response to that problem.  It is she, rather than the public—either 
directly or through its representative—who draws the roadmap for a 
distressed field.  To that end, she should be bold and not shy away from 
“administrative experimentation and reorganization” if the situation so 
requires.42  In so doing, this guardian of the public interest is to rise 
above petty rivalries and see the big picture.  Correspondingly, 
regulators are expected to be fully committed to the policy embedded in 
the regulatory scheme entrusted to their hands.  They should have “a 
proper bias toward [their agency’s] point of view.”43 
2.  Public General Manager 
Like the Facilitator, the Guardian has deep roots in Progressive-Era 
thinking.  However, whereas the former had already found its definitive 
advocate in Charles Francis Adams by the end of the nineteenth century, 
the latter had to wait a bit longer.  The Guardian emerged in the early-
twentieth-century work of scholars like Herbert Croly, the leading 
Progressive political thinker, and James Landis, one of the New Deals’ 
most influential lawyer-regulators.44  As we shall see, the influence of 
 
 42. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Administrative Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 359 (1991). 
 43. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 103-04.  See also Don K. Price, 1984 and Beyond:  Social 
Engineering or Political Values?, in AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:  PAST, PRESENT, 
FUTURE 247 (Frederick C. Mosher ed., 1975). 
 44. Landis is a legendary figure in the history of American administrative law.  As Thomas 
McCraw puts it, “[i]n the history of regulation in America, few names loom larger than that of 
James M. Landis.”  MCCRAW, supra note 24, at 153.  Landis has acquired a mythological stature 
thanks to his prominence as a scholar, his extensive experience as a regulator, and the role he played 
in the design of regulation in the post-1929 era.  He was a stellar student, clerked for Justice 
Brandeis, was appointed as the youngest dean in Harvard Law School's history, and “[w]hile still a 
young man, Landis emerged as the outstanding theoretician of American regulation.”  Id.  For 
Landis’ biography, see, for example, MCCRAW, supra note 24, at 153-221; DONALD A. RITCHIE, 
JAMES M. LANDIS:  DEAN OF REGULATORS (1980). 
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these early prophets of regulation is very much still present today, 
notably, in the work of Justice Stephen Breyer. 
The image of the person-regulator as a (public) leader,45 a vibrant 
entrepreneur,46 exuding charisma and a sense of optimism and 
confidence, is the center of the Guardian prototype.47  Befittingly, the 
jurisdiction of regulator and agency is widely, even lavishly, charted—
so much so that it seems Guardians’ authorizations are particularly prone 
to charges of nondelegation-doctrine infringements.48  Translated into 
the parlance of constitutional discourse, her actions “combine aspects of 
all three branches” of government.49  Or, as Landis put it, with the 
Guardian, the regulatory agency is granted with “an assemblage of rights 
normally exercisable by government as a whole.”50 
To analytically evaluate it, it may be useful to think of the Guardian 
type as the embodiment of a public general manager. 
To begin with, as a general manager she has a decisive role in 
continuously molding the administrative organization’s character, inter 
alia, by setting its hiring policy.  Generally, the Guardian is “in the best 
position to experiment, learn, and innovate.”51  Put in the terms 
advanced by Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite, the Guardian is the master 
of her agency’s enforcement pyramid.52  She is the one controlling the 
agency’s strategy within the pyramid; indeed, she may be the one laying 
out the shape and content of the pyramid, under the constraints of the 
pertinent legislative mandate.53  Hence, because of her close affiliation 
 
 45. Ordway Tead, Amateurs Versus Experts in Administration, 189 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 42 (1937). 
 46. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 14-36 (2001).  
Put in Carpenter’s terminology, my description of the Guardian shares several traits of Carpenter’s 
“mezzo level” regulators.  Id. at 18. 
 47. Cf. MAGALI SAFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 2-12 (1977). 
 48. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303 (1999). 
 49. Joseph B. Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission, 12 CONST. REV. 95, 95 
(1928).  
 50. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 15. 
 51. CARPENTER, supra note 46, at 21. 
 52. See AYERS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 35-41.  Likewise, regulators’ dilemmas 
presented in Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:  Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691 (2003), would usually be in the 
purview of the Guardian.  See similarly Stephen D. Sugarman, Performance-Based Regulation:  
Enterprise Responsibility for Reducing Death, Injury, and Disease Caused by Consumer Products, 
34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L 1035 (2009). 
 53. To complete the Ayers and Braithwaite discussion (see AYERS & BRAITHWAITE, supra 
note 12), typically the Facilitator is in charge of activity taking place at the base of the same 
enforcement pyramid (i.e., persuasion and self-regulation).  Furthermore, the Technician is charged 
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with the agency and position of guardianship, this administrator readily 
comes to personify the agency as well as the goals and ideals for which 
it stands; she may even come to stand for the state itself.54 
As a general manager, she is neither a mere “office-holder”55 nor a 
“specialist” regular.56  Rather, if anything, she is a “specialist[] in 
generalization . . . .”57  In fact, it is stipulated that she should be “freed 
from responsibility for the details of routine administration . . . .”58  This 
remark captures another trait of the type, namely, its lack of concern for 
organizational dimensions in the practice of regulation.  Simply put, 
scant attention, if any, is given to the institutional structure within which 
the Guardian operates.  It is as if the Guardian is projected to run a one-
man show.59 
As she is typically not expected to be intimately acquainted with 
the details of the regulated industry, the Guardian's forte lies rather in 
her ability to obtain an overarching, all-encompassing outlook.60  This 
allows her to “provid[e] unified direction . . . for . . . the industry as a 
whole . . . .”61  By the same token, her unique sphere of knowledge is 
extensive and not restricted to one particular subject matter.  
Interdisciplinarity is her leitmotif.  This allows the regulator to benefit 
from the input of sundry scientific and not-strictly-scientific fields of 
 
with monitoring the regulatee’s response to the regulator’s most recent strategy/sanction; she may 
be thus responsible to triggering an escalation in the Guardian’s punitiveness vis-à-vis a recalcitrant 
firm or industry.  For the interplay between the types within given pyramids in the area of 
occupational health and safety in various jurisdictions, see, e.g., Richard Brown, Theory and 
Practice of Regulatory Enforcement:  Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in British 
Columbia, 16 LAW & POL’Y 63 (1994); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment 
Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement:  A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 
735-45 (1997); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 651-
53 (2000).  
 54. See HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 364 (1998) (“The state, in the person of 
its . . . commissioners . . . .”). 
 55. CROLY, supra note 54, at 375. 
 56. See 2 WEBER, supra note 19, at 1001. 
 57. Tead, supra note 45, at 47. 
 58. Carl I. Wheat, The Regulation of the Interstate Telephone Rates, 51 HARV. L. REV. 846, 
883 (1938). 
 59. Cf. David D. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 234-35 (2001).  I will return to this theme below.  See infra Section III.E. 
 60. See, e.g., Joseph B. Eastman, A Twelve Point Primer on the Subject of Administrative 
Tribunals, in SELECTED PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF JOSEPH EASTMAN, 1942-1944, at 375, 376 (G. 
Lloyd Wilson ed., 1948).  
 61. Harvey Pinney, The Case for Independence of Administrative Agencies, 221 ANNALS OF 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40, 41 (1942).  See also Strauss, supra note 22, at 1268 (“[W]e expect 
an agency to try to understand and apply the whole body of statutes committed to its administration 
as a coherent consistent whole—in a programmatic way.”). 
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inquiry, which, taken together, produce “a special body of public 
administration.”62  Accordingly, as Justice Breyer explains, capable 
regulators should “understand[] science, some economics, 
administration, [and] possibly law . . . .”63 Indeed, according to Dean 
Price from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, they should 
“draw[] on the reserves of [the] university as a whole . . . .”64 
As a manager,65 the regulator commands and controls, naturally 
relying mainly on the command system.  She directs her energies to the 
execution and enforcement of desirable goals in the most rational, 
pragmatic way.  She is the one who sees the execution process through 
to its actual materialization and completion.  And according to Carl 
Wheat, she is responsible for “giv[ing] effectiveness to . . . scheme[s] of 
regulation . . . .”66  Towards that end, the regulator has to “adapt a rule to 
a situation, . . . to envisage a program or a law in its actual operations 
among men and women . . . .”67  The Guardian is thus required “to plan, 
to promote, and to police,”68 as well as to be able to successfully tackle 
unforeseeable contingencies, “to meet practical emergencies,” and, just 
as important, “to deal with men.”69  Leadership and social skills are 
indeed of the utmost importance for the regulator, who must excel in 
coordinating people and production units, and who “needs physique, 
nervous energy, . . . tact, strength to say ‘no,’ and ability to inspire others 
and to create confidence in employees and the public.”70 
The Guardian-manager’s distinctive cognitive abilities, broadly 
defined,71 are expansive and not easily concretized.  It is said that she 
“can analyze and deduce, combine and infer,” but more important, that 
she is “gifted with instinct and sagacity no less than reason.”72  In short, 
as Kenneth Culp Davis put it, the regulator is, perhaps above all, a 
“practical [person].”73 
As a public general manager, this regulator never loses sight of the 
public interest while taking care of the industry entrusted to her.  She 
 
 62. Wheat, supra note 58, at 883. 
 63. BREYER, supra note 21, at 61. 
 64. Price, supra note 43, at 243. 
 65. See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 13; see also DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
91-92 (1984).  
 66. Wheat, supra note 58, at 883. 
 67. CROLY, supra note 54, at 375. 
 68. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 15. 
 69. CROLY, supra note 54, at 375. 
 70. MARSHALL E. DIMOCK, MODERN POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 293 (1937). 
 71. See LARSON, supra note 47, at 15-39. 
 72. Adams, Boston I, supra note 28, at 19.  See also WALDO, supra note 65, at 96-97. 
 73. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (1951). 
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“build[s] coalitions behind new ideas,” and may even “change the 
agendas and preferences of politicians and the organized public.”74  In 
order to do so, the Guardian may have to demonstrate shrewd political 
skills, as well as the “moral courage to resist public opinion when it is 
wrong . . . .”75  The last remark brings forward the important issue of the 
relationships between the regulator and the public.  It is interesting to 
note that various metaphors provide a useful picture of the regulator’s 
role vis-à-vis the public.  Richard Lazarus, referring to the EPA, uses 
doctor-patient imagery:  “[The] EPA cannot effectively manage public 
risk without the confidence of the public any more than a doctor could 
treat a patient without that patient’s trust.”76  Taking a similar approach, 
one of Adams’s few excursions into this prototype used a teacher-
student metaphor.  He urged his fellow Bostonians, “For once, let 
reflection precede action . . . . The community must go back to school, 
and it only remains to find the schoolmaster.”77 
The fact that the schoolmaster-like regulator is expected not only to 
be fair “in utterance and act,” but also to have the “moral courage to 
resist public opinion when it is wrong”78 is significant for at least two 
reasons.  Notice, first, that this emphasis is in tension with the Facilitator 
prototype.  The Facilitator does not envisage such a discord between the 
public and regulators.  Adopting a contrary approach, Adolph Berle 
states, “[T]he popular will does not discover a method.”79 
Second, in allowing that regulators may—indeed, they are expected 
to—face opposition from some segments of society, one might say that 
 
 74. CARPENTER, supra note 46, at 22, 15 (emphasis omitted). 
 75. Samuel O. Dunn, Regulation by Commission, 199 N. AM. REV. 205, 206 (1914).  See 
similarly MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:  ASKING THE 
WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 80-81 (1994). 
 76. Lazarus, supra note 42, at 351.  Others similarly referred to the regulator as a doctor.  See 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 
1678 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation], and BREYER, supra note 21, at 62. 
 77. Adams, Boston I, supra note 28, at 18.  Herbert Croly had a more demanding, even 
grandiose, vision of regulators.  Croly stipulates that the organization and operation of agencies 
“should be adapted to the making of men rather than of office-holders.”  CROLY, supra note 54, at 
375.  Later on he adds, “The administration of a progressive democracy will need and must 
foreshadow a completer [sic] kind of democratic manhood.”  Id. at 376. 
 78. Dunn, supra note 75, at 206. 
 79. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 
430, 439 (1917).  As we can see, the public administration literature is peppered with the theme of 
regulators’ expertise.  See also, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 82-86.  Indeed, I have argued 
elsewhere that most of the literature reviewed in this Article could be reorganized around this 
theme.  See Sagy, supra note 19.  While there is an overlap between the present study, which 
reviews competing types of regulators in the literature, and an inquiry tracing the different concepts 
of administrative expertise informing the same literature, the latter inquiry cannot be pursued here, 
for it relies more heavily on a wider historical analysis than that offered here. 
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the Guardian type takes on a more realistic view of the administrative 
process than that of the Facilitator prototype.  But this realism 
necessarily raises the vexing issue of the appropriate relationship 
between politics—the arena where contentious public sentiments are 
openly aired and popular demands asserted—and public regulation.  This 
issue is particularly relevant in the context of the Guardian prototype 
since, as we shall see, more than in the case of the other two types, the 
political nature of this public regulator is (nearly) candidly 
acknowledged.80 
C. The Technician 
1.  Synopsis 
In a way, the Technician is the simplest of the three prototypes.  It 
refers to “the civil servant,” the bureaucrats of the agency, those core 
officials who are the backbone of any organization.  It is about the 
people who make the organizational beast tick, the workers on the 
assembly line.  It is best understood in comparison to the other two 
types. 
The Technician shares with the Facilitator type the emphasis on 
information-gathering capabilities; yet, the Technician might very well 
be required to actually implement regulatory schemes, and in that sense, 
resembles the Guardian.  However, unlike the Guardian, the 
Technician's sphere of action is always limited, well demarcated, and 
specific.  She is plainly a “specialist.”81  This trait should not be taken as 
a sign of weakness, for unlike the other two she is a certified expert, a 
professional.82  The Technician’s authority is entirely dependent on her 
acknowledged, formal training, which prepares her for a career of public 
service.  Indeed, noticeably more so than in the case of the two other 
prototypes, the Technician is often engaged in a long-term commitment 
to the regulatory endeavor.83 
 
 80. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 81. CROLY, supra note 54, at 375. 
 82. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 379-82 
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).  This may be the appropriate time to note that although my Technician 
shares some of the traits of James Wilson’s Professional, mine is a fuller, more rounded description 
(the disparity has to do with our different motivations in typifying regulators).  Incidentally, under 
Wilson’s terminology, the Facilitator and the Guardian would normally be either careerists or 
politicians.  See id. at 372-97. 
 83. See, e.g., James Landis, Significance of Administrative Commissions in the Growth of the 
Law, 12 IND. L.J. 471, 477 (1937) (successful regulation could be had by “men ready to devote their 
lives to the task.”). 
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2.  A Specialist 
First, there is the issue of the regulator’s skills, which are much 
more specialized than those of the Guardian.  Having this type of 
regulator in mind, commentators speak of “technical expert[ise]” and 
“technocratic” skills.84  Thus, for example, the famous Acheson 
Committee, the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, whose final report was released in the beginning of 1941,85 
reasoned, “In many cases a principal reason for establishing an agency 
has been the need to bring to bear upon particular problems technical or 
professional skills.”86  Half a century later, Lazarus spoke similarly of 
the agency’s “technical employees.”87 
Second, although, unlike the Facilitator, the Technician might also 
have executorial duties, they are strictly limited in three ways:  these 
duties are specific, partial, and have to be carried out in accordance with 
a preordained protocol.88  They are so limited because, generally, the 
Technician administrators’ skills are rooted in “single-mindedness of 
devotion to a specific problem,”89 which in time produces area-specific 
“experience.”90  Moreover, these regulators are normally responsible for 
carrying out tasks of lower order than those of Guardian-style 
commissioners.  Namely, Technicians are typically called upon to carry 
out routine tasks that do not encompass the administrative process in its 
entirety and do not call for “high level” policymaking.  Some 
commentators even go so far as to posit that Technicians conduct 
“simplistic analysis,” which leaves little room for intuition.91  Reflecting 
this approach, it has been argued that the Technician-regulator is in the 
business of the “making of detailed regulations in highly specialized 
fields such as the technical operation of radio stations or the importation 
of honey bees or the shipment of insects . . . .”92  Therefore, it has been 
 
 84. Eastman, supra note 60, at 376; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and 
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1085 (1990). 
 85. On the Attorney General’s Committee, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 
1594-98, 1632-42 (1996). 
 86. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 19-20 (1941). 
 87. Lazarus, supra note 42, at 353. 
 88. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99. 
 89. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 35.  See also e.g., id., at 27, 30, 87. 
 90. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 84, at 1089. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Louis G. Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966, 968 
(1936). 
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maintained that this regulator must have the “ability and desire to devote 
fifty-two weeks a year, year after a year, to a particular problem.”93 
As we can see, when the Technician is described, there is no place 
for the kind of almost greater-than-life portrayal of the regulator one 
finds in the Guardian literature.  Thus, we find even Landis writing at 
some point, “In the business of governing a nation . . . we must take into 
account the fact that government will be operated by men of average 
talent and average ability and we must therefore devise our 
administrative processes with that in mind.”94  In light of all this, it is 
obvious that whereas the command system is the Guardian's natural, but 
not exclusive, weapon, the more-limited-in-scope permit and voucher 
are the Technician’s.95 
Third, the world of the Technician is a world of hierarchies and of 
mass production.  It is a Durkheimian world of specialization96 in which 
regulators are clearly a part of “hierarchically structured 
organizations.”97  Correspondingly, it is held that Technician-regulators 
should be “confine[d] . . . to a formal procedure.”98  Such procedures, 
Gerald Henderson noted in his 1924 study of the Federal Trade 
Commission, “may indeed at times clip the wings of genius, but . . . will 
serve to create conditions under which average men are more likely to 
arrive at just results.”99 
The Technician is thus projected to be a professional, a career 
regulator, whose ken of responsibility is relatively limited.  Yet, 
although an expert, this regulator who is neatly situated within a 
bureaucratic organization may very well be under a variety of “external” 
(i.e., non-professional, possibly “political”) sources of influence:  
notably by politically-appointed Guardian-commissioners, if not directly 
 
 93. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 23. 
 94. Id. at 57.  See also George Nebolsine, Review, 48 YALE L.J. 929, 930 (1939) (reviewing 
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, supra note 21) (“[O]ur administrative agencies, in the 
long run, will be operated by people of average ability.”). 
 95. See infra Section IV.C., where I provide examples of Technician-managed permit-
granting authority. 
 96. See EMIL DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., 1984); 
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS 377-454 (1977). 
 97. Barron & Kagan, supra note 59, at 234-35.  See also THOMAS O. MCGARITY, 
REINVENTING RATIONALITY:  THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACY 179 (1991). 
 98. GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 328 (1924).  No wonder, 
then, that when discussing this prototype, scholars often refer to administrators as “employees” or 
“staff.”  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 87. 
 99. HENDERSON, supra note 98, at 328. 
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by the President.100  Even so, tension between different levels of the 
organization may be common—inter alia, due to professionalism of (or 
assertions thereof by) mid/low-level regulators.101  “Career agency 
staff,” one account notes, “as a rule, are [sic] (proudly) resistant to broad 
political influence . . . .”102  Under these circumstances, the potential for 
explosion is evident.  We shall return to this subject below.103 
III.  AXES OF ANALYSIS:  INFORMATION, LEGITIMACY, POWER 
This Part will critically examine several features of the types that 
their exposés in Part II bring to the fore.  The first section questions 
regulators’ ability to process information, given the foundational role 
information has in any decision-making setting.  The second section 
touches upon the sensitive issue of regulation's affinity to politics.  The 
following consideration, power, introduces to the discussion a 
Foucauldian perspective on public regulation, which is often missing in 
the legal literature.  The third section goes after a perennial concern in 
the American literature on regulation, legitimacy.  Finally, I briefly 
mention the institutional framework within which regulation is 
conducted according to each type in order to emphasize a prevalent, 
unfortunate lacuna in the legal literature that has been generally turning 
a cold shoulder to a positive examination of the realities of actual 
administration.104 
I single out these axes of analysis because the literature has 
identified them as major reasons for concern in the operation of 
agencies.  By including literature that grapples with these subjects I 
deliberately turn “problems” associated with the prototypes into an 
integral part of their definitions.  Moreover, as the following discussion 
will demonstrate, these axes cut to the core of—and work out differently 
 
 100. According to advocates of the “presidential control” model of legitimacy of administrative 
agencies, their submission to the control of the President—that is, the democratically elected official 
most responsive to the people (as the President is nationally accountable)—renders their operation 
legitimate.  See Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).  Note that according to the presidential control model of 
regulation, the President is encouraged to “politically” direct non-independent agencies to ensure 
political accountability.  For an analysis of the literature detailing this model, see Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485-515 (2003). For other models of legitimacy, see id. at 469-91; see 
generally Stewart, Reformation, supra note 76, and Frug, supra note 19. 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 204-208 & 295-298 (discussing professionalism’s 
tendency to stand in the way of organizational integration). 
 102. Barron & Kagan, supra note 59, at 242. 
 103. See infra Section III.E. 
 104. See supra note 22. 
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for—each type.  They therefore showcase the diversity of the types (see 
Table 2, below).105 
A. The Problem of Information 
Information has always been key to the success of the regulatory 
enterprise.  However, it has also become evident that processes of 
gathering, processing, and disseminating information are costly, and 
therefore often incomplete, and prone to biases and other 
mishandlings.106  Hence, information, once thought to be a blessing, has 
become a problem to be reckoned with, especially when an information-
intensive operation such as public regulation is involved. 
Regulation requires information—a great deal of information—to 
be rational and have an impact.107  However, information is always 
limited and expensive.  For that reason alone, Herbert Simon reasoned in 
1957 that as individuals we cannot reach “any high degree of 
rationality.”108  Taking a similar approach, Charles Lindblom made the 
influential distinction between the “Root” (i.e., synoptic) and “Branch” 
(i.e., partial and incremental) analyses of possible policies.109  Lindblom 
argues that the former methodology is utterly impractical, holding that 
regulatory bodies can (and actually do) only operate under the precepts 
of the incremental methodology.110  Reverting to Adams’s and Landis’s 
 
 105. Note further that these theoretical considerations cover key items in the syllabi of three 
central “schools” of regulation studies:  Idealist, Positive, and Critical.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Explaining Administrative Process:  Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal 
Development, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1990). 
 106. See generally Cass Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:  
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 626-29 (1999).  
 107. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987) (“[D]ecisions depend on the information that 
underpins them and on the means for relating that information to decisions that are permissible 
according to the strictures of administrative law.”).  See generally Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal 
Regulatory Model:  A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1983). 
 108. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR:  A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 79 (2d ed. 1957).  See also, e.g., Gifford, supra 
note 107, at 316; Richard B. Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARV. L. REV. 371, 376, 
379 (1987) [hereinafter Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence] (reviewing MEIR DAN-COHEN, 
RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS:  A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); 
BREYER, supra note 21, at 9 (“In carrying out [risk assessment] activities, . . . regulators often find 
that they simply lack critically important scientific or empirical data . . . .”), 42-48. 
 109. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 
80 (1959) [hereinafter Lindblom, ‘Muddling Through’]; Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not 
Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517 (1979).  For an application of Lindblom's concepts in the 
analysis of administrative law, see Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981). 
 110. Lindblom, ‘Muddling Through,’ supra note 109, at 80. 
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precepts, it seems that somehow the Facilitator is to make possible 
public synoptic discussion and that the Guardian's is also the synoptic 
method; the Technician’s is the incremental methodology. 
But scarcity is only one problem associated with information.  For 
it turns out that even where information is readily available, processes of 
decisionmaking that depend on it are in peril.  At least partially spurred 
by the path-breaking work of Amos Tverskyand Daniel Khneman, 
scholars have begun to question the dicta that abundant information is 
always good and public deliberation even more so.111  In Tversky and 
Khneman, “the imperfections of human perception and decision” occupy 
central stage.112  They, along with other behavioral social scientists, 
point at common human cognitive fallacies bearing on our 
understanding of information, notably that “[w]e simplify radically.”113  
To be sure, human cognitive limitations, which are limits on human 
rationality, naturally apply to regulators along with their clientele.114 
Particularly troubling from Adams’s point-of-view is behavioral 
social scientists’ finding that deliberators are easily manipulated, by, for 
example, careful framing of problems.115  Moreover, abundant 
information may even be counter-productive because the more 
information one gets, the harder it is to filter out what really matters.  
“With respect to information,” notes Cass Sunstein, “less may be 
more.”116  Various studies have also argued that quite often the public 
shows no interest in and/or cannot understand available technical 
information.117 
While detrimental to all types of regulators (Technician included), 
findings such as these are particularly damaging to any Adams-style 
 
 111. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE 
L.J. 71 (2000). 
 112. Amos Tversky & Daniel Khneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
 113. BREYER, supra note 21, at 35. 
 114. Such limitations, as they affected organizational behavior, have been noted already half a 
century ago by leading political scientists.  See notably the classic JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. 
SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958), e.g., at pages 190 and 203 ff. 
 115. See generally the helpful survey offered in Carol A. Heimer, Social Structure, 
Psychology, and the Estimation of Risk, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 491 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Group 
Judgments:  Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 
(2005) . 
 116. Sunstein, Informational Regulation, supra note 106, at 627. 
 117. See id. (“People have a limited ability to process information.”).  See also Joel Yellin, 
Science, Technology, and Administrative Government:  Institutional Designs for Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1305 (1983).  Cf. Henry R. Seager, The New Anti-Trust Acts, 
30 POL. SCI. Q. 448, 461-62 (1915). 
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deliberative model of regulation (e.g., civic republicanism), since they 
imply that constructive public deliberation is quite hard to come by.118 
B. Administration and Politics 
1.  The Public Interest (and the Public Choice) 
As a prelude to the issue of politics and regulation, I would like 
now to address a closely related question that cuts across the tripartite 
typology.  At issue is the chronic question of whose interests regulation 
actually serves (and/or should serve):  those of potent interest groups, ad 
hoc stakeholders’ coalitions, or those interests that are deemed to 
guarantee a generalized “public good.”119 
To illustrate, according to civic republican ideas,120 agency-
orchestrated administrative processes have the potential to transform 
members of the community through a deliberative public discourse 
where parties’ opinions are freely expressed.  Under such theories, 
relevant interest groups’ participation is a must; regulation is the 
coordination of contentious public sentiments, as with any political 
 
 118. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (stating under the civic republican model “government’s primary 
responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach 
consensus on the common good.”).  See generally Croley, supra note 22, at 76-86.  For a critical 
assessments of the utility in participation and open deliberation in administrative processes, see 
Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 115, at 993 (noting, inter alia, “with group discussion, 
individual [cognitive] errors are usually propagated, not eliminated . . . .”); BREYER, supra note 21, 
at 33-39, 80.  More directly on the morality of participation, see Allen Buchanan, Political 
Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 ETHICS 689 (2002); compare Stewart, Organizational 
Jurisprudence, supra note 108, at 381 (“Participation in group deliberation and decisionmaking can 
have a constitutive function . . . [but it] can also serve as a good in itself.”) with Adler, Beyond 
Efficiency, supra note 14, at 267-89. 
 119. The “public good” may be formulated in terms of economic efficiency.  See Richard B. 
Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability:  Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2167, 2173 (2000) (“[R]isk regulation today has increasingly assumed the form of risk-
benefit optimization.”).  As rightly noted by Howard Latin, various commentators use “efficiency” 
quite differently in the context of environmental regulation.  See Latin, supra note 1, at 1271 n.19, 
1291-92.  For a historical analysis of the various meanings of the concept of the “common good/the 
public interest” acquired since the turn of the twentieth century, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, 
CONTESTED TRUTHS:  KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 176-211 (1987). 
 120. See supra note 118. 
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process,121 and the public interest is that of the participating public.  
This position is standard in the more recent Facilitator literature.122 
On the other hand, according to the Guardian prototype, the 
regulator should approximate the overall interest of the general public—
as she herself defines it—rather than simply the interests of those few 
groups participating in the administrative process.  This position falls in 
line with Progressive-Era understanding of the term “public interest,” 
which symbolized an idealized, synergetic, and unified political 
community.123  This seems to be the right place to note that the public 
choice literature has been particularly influential in challenging this 
benign perception of the public regulator laboring for the public interest.  
Diverse as they are, public choice theorists generally proceed under the 
understanding that, while conducting public affairs, bureaucrats—and 
other public officials—normally focus on the maximization of their own 
welfare.124  Viewed through this theoretical prism, the Guardian 
prototype is premised on a “romantic” perception of public regulation.125 
2.  On Politics- and Policy-Making 
The starting point for the investigation of the relationship between 
regulation and politics is the Progressive Era’s suspicion of state and 
national politics.  Progressives fulminated against what they thought was 
the dire state of American politics.126  To many of them, politics was a 
 
 121. See Patricia Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes:  A New Role for Courts?, 10 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (1985) (stating interest group models of the administrative process 
“views the regulatory process in essentially political terms . . . .”). 
 122. This approach is compatible with Daniel Rodgers’s observation that during the first 
decades of the twentieth century, scholars began to think of society as a collection of fragments and 
shards, an arena where conflicting interests vie for dominance.  DANIEL RODGERS, supra note 119, 
at 209-11.  By the mid-1930s, he reports, “[t]he integrative abstractions of the nineteenth century 
were stuffed into the closet.  What endured was Interests [sic].”  Id. at 211. 
 123. See id. at 179-187.  Cf. note 120.  Finally, I should note that the Technician is agnostic 
with regard to the question at issue.  She is typically expected to serve the interests identified by the 
socially-authorized decisionmakers, whoever they may be. 
 124. For general surveys on the public choice literature, see, for example, DANIEL A. FARBER 
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the 
Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746 (1998); André 
Blais & Stéphane Dion, Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers?  The Niskanen Model & Its Critics, 
22 POLITY 655 (1990).  But see also James Wilson, supra note 82, at 361-63, 387-94; Croley, supra 
note 22, at 41-56. 
 125. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC CHOICE:  THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A 
RESEARCH PROGRAM—WORKING PAPER 8 (2003), available at 
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/pdf%20links/Booklet.pdf. (“Public choice may be 
summarized by the three-word description ‘politics without romance.’”). 
 126. For the Progressive “movement,” see sources cited supra note 24. 
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source of evil and the political process erratic and irrational, even 
whimsical.127  They did not heed, and even denied, politics’ generative 
role in the American state.128  As many Progressives saw it, American 
politics was steeped in all sorts of biases that marred public affairs.  
Their mission was to purge the American government from the evils of 
politics.129  Part of the solution was the introduction of a non-political 
administrative regulation to define and attend to the “true” public 
interest.130  As the Supreme Court put it in 1910, administrative agencies 
were accordingly required to exercise their powers “in the coldest 
neutrality.”131 
These convictions are not turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
peculiarities.  For example, Justice Stephen Breyer has recently reasoned 
that “not every risk-related matter need become a public issue.  A 
depoliticized regulatory process might produce better results . . . .”132  
True, an underlying apolitical ethos colors past and present 
pronouncements of the Guardian in particular.  For that reason, and due 
to its corresponding concept of the public interest and position of 
leadership, the Guardian type, in particular, has been exposed to 
repeated attacks on that score.133 
It is surely difficult to accept a straightforward refusal to 
acknowledge the role played by politics in the shaping of public 
policies.134  As we shall now see, Progressives who advance the 
 
 127. See, e.g., MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY (1977) 73-76. 
 128. For this, Progressives incurred harsh criticism.  See notably JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY 
AND SOCIAL ETHICS (1902). 
 129. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE:  THE 
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 1-162 (1982). 
 130. Thus, for example, according to Joseph Eastman, “[A]part from statutory direction, [the 
ICC] must be as removed from influence by the President, Congress, or any political agency as the 
Supreme Court itself.”  BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 62 (quoting FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF 
TRANSPORTATION, SECOND REPORT, S. DOC. NO. 152, at 37 (1934)).  Eastman was a legendary ICC 
Commissioner in the first half of the twentieth century.  See, e.g., Carl B. Swisher, Joseph B. 
Eastman—Public Servant, 5 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 34 (1945). 
 131. ICC v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910). 
 132. BREYER, supra note 21, at 55-56.  Sharing this view, Landis had noted half a century 
before Breyer, “In seeking to make [administrative commissions] different to a degree from the 
ordinary political agency, the hope seems to have been that the policies that they have been 
authorized to pursue will survive the ordinary vicissitudes of politics.”  Landis, supra note 83, at 
475-76.  Tellingly, according to Landis, policies are distant from politics only “to a degree.”  Id.  
Similarly, Justice Breyer opined that regulators “must have a degree of political insulation . . . .” 
BREYER, supra note 21, at 60 (emphasis omitted). 
 133. The just-mentioned public-choice literature obviously shares some of the assumptions 
informing such attacks.  See sources mentioned supra note 1. 
 134. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Basic Issues:  An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1283 (1955) 
[hereinafter Jaffe, Basic Issues] (“Most rule-making involves the weighing of a complex of 
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Guardian prototype give a particular, quite minimalist definition to 
“politics,” attempting to eschew the issue:  for example, Herbert Croly, 
who holds that the Guardian administrator is “a promoter and 
propagandist”135 of social policies, argues that due to her steadfast 
commitment to the public interest, the regulator is “lifted out of the 
realm of partisan and factious political controversy” while putting to 
force a certain social policy.136  This outlook displays a restricted grasp 
of “politics” and an idealized view of the public interest.  According to 
this approach, the category of “the political” seems to be merely a 
manifest commitment to one’s particular party views, rather than, say, 
“the exercise of discretion in channeling the coercive powers of the state 
in one direction rather than another.”137 
Complementing the Progressive description, it is maintained that 
Congress should be the arena in which “party policies” are debated.138  
Thus, for example, according to Landis, the Legislature’s function is to 
process “those postulates [that] have . . . enlisted the loyalties and faiths 
of classes of people. . . .”139  It should first intercept the popular will and 
then synthesize and transform it into a coherent legislative edict, having 
purged it from residues of politics.  By so doing, Congress confers on 
the ensuing administrative action “that finality and moral sanction 
necessary for enforcement. . . .”140  This remark alludes to the belief that 
keeping politics at arm’s length would render regulation legitimate. 
Concerns of the lack of legitimacy clearly dominate the whole politics-
regulation debate.  (Shortly I will address directly the issue of 
legitimacy.) 
To conclude, Progressive thinkers and their sympathizers argue that 
administrative discretion could be exercised objectively, that is, 
 
considerations, many of them of the kind we call political . . . .”); Charles A. Reich, The Law of the 
Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1235 (1966). 
 135. CROLY, supra note 54, at 361. 
 136. Id.  See similarly Eastman, supra note 49, at 101 (stating commissions “are clearly 
nonpartisan in their makeup, and party policies do not enter into their activities. . . .”). 
 137. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 861 
(2001).  Progressives’ view of the political resembles “positive scholars’” use of the term, as 
identified by Professor Friedman in the context discussed in Friedman, supra note 22, at 271. 
Michel Foucault has expanded our horizons in speaking of political technology, bio-power, and 
governmentality.  See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 87-104 
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foucault, Governmentality].  See generally HUBERT 
L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT:  BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND 
HERMENEUTICS 133-42 (2d. ed. 1983), and SARA MILLS, DISCOURSE 26-29, 71 (2d ed. 2004). 
 138. See supra note 136. 
 139. LANDIS, supra note 21, at 59. 
 140. Id. at 60. 
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apolitically.  Robert Cooper, for example, warned in 1937 against 
“confusing partiality and bias with the exercise of administrative 
discretion.”141  The distinction made in this literature is between 
processes whereby social power-struggles are played out—politics—and 
the meticulous systematic process of materializing social goals—policy. 
Such ambiguous positions, which hold that the regulator is 
inescapably involved in the making of divisive public policies, but not in 
“politics,” are most prominently encoded in the design of the 
Guardian.142  Yet, many reject the suggestion that policymaking is not 
“politics,” even holding the whole administrative process, from top to 
bottom, to be political.143  Critics submit, particularly in connection with 
the Guardian, “Regulation is and always will be an intensely political 
process.”144 
Detractors go further and point out that the political players—above 
all, the President and members of Congress—may leave clear 
fingerprints of political intervention in commission-made regulation.145  
It is noted, for example, that the President might try to impact the 
agency, not only by direct means, such as appointing favorable 
commissioners,146 but also through an array of other formal and informal 
ways.  Those ways include strategically approving or disproving 
commissions’ appropriation requests, recommending the commission to 
implement a particular policy, and issuing Executive Orders.147  
 
 141. Robert M. Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, Part II, 35 MICH. L. 
REV. 565, 574 (1937). 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 143. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 92, at 971 (stating Agencies are “de facto political 
entities.”); E. P. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 138 (1936) 
(“Administrators cannot be given the responsibilities of statesmen without incurring likewise the 
tribulations of politicians.”); and Louis Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective:  
Administrative Limitations in Political Setting, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COMMISSION. L. REV. 565 (1970).  
 144. BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 183.  See also id. at 161 (“Only in a totalitarian society is 
the general welfare a matter of private, non political concern.”).  These propositions are naturally at 
variance with idea of independent agencies (i.e., federal agencies, such as the EPA and the FTC, 
whose heads the President could remove only for a cause).  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 426 
(“[T]he fact is that independent agencies are not independent at all.  Indeed, such agencies are 
highly responsive to shifts in political opinion . . . .”). 
 145. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 107, at 274 (stating, “Thus, in the end, the politics 
of the bureaucracy will mirror the politics surrounding Congress and the president.”). 
 146. This is not a novel revelation, of course.  See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 106-07.  
See similarly Report of the Special Committee of Administrative Law, 57 Annual Report of the 
ABA 539, 546 (1934) (“[A]ppointments to administrative tribunals are all too generally classed as 
patronage . . . .”). 
 147. For these and other avenues of presidential influence on commissions, see BERNSTEIN, 
supra note 21, at 106, 131-34, and Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001). 
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Congress, too, may wield considerable power on commissions through 
legislation, the appropriation process, Congressional investigation, and 
informal contacts between members of Congress and commissioners.148 
The last chapter in the saga is not reassuring.  Regulators’ 
dependencies on the political branches may put them in the mercy of the 
regulated industry, for, as Samuel Huntington explains, “[i]f an agency 
is to be viable,” it has to “maintain a net preponderance of political 
support over political opposition.”149  Such support could come either 
directly from the political branches or through the agency clientele, 
whether that be the regulated industry or a public interest group.  This 
dynamic brings up, of course, the loaded topic of “capture.”150  In any 
event, “[w]e may take it as the key feature of any constituency that it can 
cripple or kill an agency.”151  Many find the emerging picture very 
disconcerting.  Important for our purpose, this picture surely raises a 
series of challenges for the Guardian type in particular. 
Lastly, maybe the Technician, with her limited scope of discretion, 
could fare better in the regulation-politics debate?  Indeed, several 
leading proponents of the Technician type have argued that “public 
administration is capable of becoming a ‘value-free’ science in its own 
right . . . .”152  They strongly believed that such a science holds the 
possibility of “enthroning intelligence where hatred, prejudice and 
passion now hold sway[.]”153  The “science of administration,” a late-
 
 148. BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 131-37, 151.  For a concrete analysis, see ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY:  THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST 
POLICY 181-87 (1980). 
 149. Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC:  The Commission, the Railroads, and 
the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 470 (1952). 
 150. Theories of agency “capture” were put forward early on by political scientists.  See, e.g., 
id.; BERNSTEIN, supra note 21.  For a survey on the (up-to-1975) literature devoted to capture, see 
Thomas K. McCraw, Regulation in America:  A Review Article, 49 BUS. HIST. REV. 159 (1975).  
Even defenders of the administrative branch had to concede to some of these condemnations.  
Agency defenders would retort, however, that agencies were “ossified” because of excessive review 
of their decisions by courts, Congress, and the Executive branch, and because of debilitating 
inadequate funding and staffing.  See generally MCGARITY, supra note 97.  The EPA is regularly 
given as a prime example of such predicaments.  See William Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, 
in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER 397 (Robert V. Percival & 
Dorothy C. Alevizanos eds., 1997) (a reprint from ENVTL. FORUM 25 (Nov./Dec. 1995) (the author 
served twice as the EPA Administrator)); Lazarus, supra note 42, at 328-58.  See Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Unruly Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 23 (1990) (with respect to 
judicial review). 
 151. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 54 (1985). 
 152. Nicholas Henry, The Emergence of Public Administration as a Field of Study, A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 37, 41-42 (Ralph C. Chandler 
ed., 1987) [hereinafter CENTENNIAL HISTORY]. 
 153. Charles E. Merriam, Political Research, 16 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 321 (1922). 
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nineteenth-century political science discipline dedicated to a scientific 
study of the modern phenomenon of public administrations, was founded 
on these postulates.154  This school held that there was, and there should 
have been, regulatory activity that was strictly not political. 
Hence we find Professor Woodrow Wilson, who is regarded “the 
Founding Father of public administration as a discipline,”155 insisting, 
“[A]dministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics . . . . 
Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be 
suffered to manipulate its offices.”156  As is often the case, description 
and prescription are frequently wedded in the Technician literature, 
which holds that popular will, values, interests, politics, or any 
comparable term (should) remain outside the administrative machinery.  
Subjective desires are thus kept away from the administrative process, 
which, in turn, is allowed to run its objective course.157  This train of 
thought leads to a sharply bifurcated, or even multi-layered, conception 
of the administrative process, where politics is made at the outer rim of 
the organization (normally by Guardians or their elected superiors) while 
Technicians handle essentially mechanical tasks at the lowest rungs of 
the hierarchy.158  As we shall now see, it is doubtful whether this 
presentation accurately conveys the Technicians’ contribution to 
 
 154. See PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION (Luther Gulick & L. Urwick eds., 
1937).  See also, e.g., Ernest Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 403 
(1894); FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION (1900) [hereinafter GOODNOW, 
POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION]; FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1905).  For the history of the science of administration, see, for 
example, Wallace S. Sayre, Premises of Public Administration:  Past and Emerging, 18 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 102, (1958); Paul P. Van Riper, The American Administrative State:  Wilson and the 
Founders, in CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 152, at 3. 
 155. DWIGHT WALDO, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 20 (1955). 
 156. Woodrow Wilson, supra note 21, at 210.  See also GOODNOW, POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 154, at 85 (“The fact is, then, that there is a large part of 
administration which is unconnected with politics, which should therefore be relieved very largely, 
if not altogether, from the control of political bodies.”).  The politics-administration dichotomy was 
widely challenged by political scientists after the Second World War.  See generally Henry, 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 149, at 40-48; Dwight Waldo, Politics and Administration:  On 
Thinking about a Complex Relationship, in CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 152, at 89, 92-94.  
Finally, the alleged dichotomy is helpful in enhancing agencies’ (at least sociological) legitimacy.  
Cf. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 782 (2001). 
 157. This approach is not a thing of the past.  Lazarus argued in 1991, as part of his attempt to 
“dispel[] the myth of agency capture,”  Lazarus, supra note 42, at 364, “The extent to which an 
agency employee’s ideology affects her behavior within the agency is also far from clear.”  Lazarus, 
supra note 42, at 366 n.345.  But see Frug, supra note 19, at 1312-17. 
 158. See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
11 (1960) (lamenting the “deterioration in the quality of . . . personnel, . . .both at the top level and 
throughout the staff.”).  See also Jaffe, supra note 134, at 1283. 
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processes of regulation.  One thing surely missing from the picture is 
power, a concept not easily ignored when public regulation is at issue. 
C. Enters Power 
Indeed, at first blush the Technician bureaucrat-regulator seems to 
exert the least coercive power out of the three types:  she has the least 
discretion—she “simply” executes the letter of the law—and hers is only 
“technical,” strictly professional knowledge.159  Furthermore, the 
bureaucratic structure within which she operates and without which her 
function is meaningless also constrains this regulator’s sphere of 
operation.160  Power, it seems, is a non-issue when in the hands of a 
Technician. 
Yet, as Max Weber, the great theoretician and critic of modern 
bureaucracy, noted, “Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally 
domination through knowledge.”161  One form of such domination was 
explored by Michel Foucault’s original concept of “disciplinary 
power”:162  a form of finely-cut, yet potent power, which is diffused 
throughout the body politic, inter alia, by mechanisms of surveillance 
and supervision.163  A central theme running through Foucault’s 
manifold work is the intimate relationship between expanding practices 
of knowledge-acquisition and the entrenchment and likewise capillary 
 
 159. As we shall see, these considerations bear heavily on the Technician’s main sources of 
legitimacy.  See infra note 195. 
 160. The abovementioned issue of the “public interest” supports this impression.  Unlike the 
other two types, this archetype brackets off the question of who should command the administrative 
organization.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 122-123 (The Guardian’s and Facilitator’s 
perception of the public interest).  The Technician’s usefulness emanates from her skillful execution 
of other people’s policies, whatever they may be and whoever may make them:  the public, an 
elected assembly, or the President. 
 161. 1 WEBER, supra note 19, at 225. 
 162. I mention Foucault at this point not to provide a detailed account of his conception of 
power—I most certainly do not—but because, to my mind, the extant legal literature on 
administrative regulation is not attentive enough to regulation’s dimensions of “power,” which are 
crucial for full understanding of the realities of regulation.  My discussion may suggest the potential 
in attending to these dimensions.  For a short introduction to Foucault “in the law,” see Hugh 
Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 449 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1996).  On 
Foucault's concept of “power,” see generally Dany Lacombe, Reforming Foucault, A Critique of the 
Social Control Thesis, 47 BRIT. J. SOC. 332, 337-348 (1996); DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 
137, at 184-204; DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:  A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
THEORY 168-75 (1990).  For a critique of Foucault’s concept of power, see LUKES, supra note 20, 
at 88-107. 
 163. See Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 137, 
at 208-26, where Foucault explains that a key characteristic of disciplinary power is its double 
(objectifying and subjectifying) movement enveloping the individual, treated consequently as a 
type. 
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expansion of power in the West.164  Foucault explored processes 
whereby information concerning members of society is collected, 
aggregated, and statistically processed to produce a generic profile of a 
type, e.g., the lunatic or the criminal, to be treated in a “professional” 
manner.165 
There is no gainsay, certainly after Foucault, that specialized 
knowledge, which is the pride and joy of Technicians both in and 
outside the bureaucracy, has a troubling, even violent genealogy.166  This 
violence is reenacted, even reinforced, whenever such power is put to 
use.  Add to all that common biases in the handling of information—
even by professionals167—and mere “technical” power no longer appears 
innocent at all. 
Regulation, as a form of social control, is bound to raise acute 
problems of power also with regard to the other types of regulators.  
What other Foucauldian concepts of power best capture the essence of 
these other types? 
The concept of “security,” as used in the Foucauldian terminology, 
is the modality of power best suited to the Facilitator.  Mechanisms of 
“security” relate to the modern, liberal state’s growing interest in the 
governed as an aggregate of people composing a population; such 
mechanisms are added to, rather than replace, techniques of discipline.168  
According to Foucault, these are “mechanisms or modes of state 
intervention whose function is to assure the security of those natural 
phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of 
population . . . .”169  The state’s focus on population and the individuals 
as part of a species is a corner stone in the emergence of 
“governmentality,” a neologism coined by Foucault to describe various, 
 
 164. For a classic formulation, see, for example, MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (“[P]ower and knowledge directly imply 
one another . . . there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations.”).  On power/knowledge, see, for example, DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 137, at 188-
97. 
 165. See Robert Castel, From Dangerousness to Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 
135, at 281-96. 
 166. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 162, at 454-55. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 168. See Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 137, at 102-04. 
 169. Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality:  An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, 
supra note 137, at 19 (quoting from an unpublished lecture of Foucault, delivered in the Collège de 
France on April 5, 1978). 
31
Sagy: A Triptych of Regulators
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
8_SAGY_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOC 2/22/20112:13 PM 
456 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:425 
interlocking strategies of (what, to Foucault’s chagrin, might be called 
“private” and “public”) government.170 
“Security,” as Foucault uses the term, may be understood as the 
delegation of regulatory authority to private organizations so that they 
may discipline their clientele in the direction desirable to the state.  
Properly understood, this move is best exemplified with laissez faire.  As 
Foucauldians see it, a regime of laissez faire should not be regarded as a 
state’s abdication of interest in its population.  Quite the contrary, the 
modern liberal state is distinguished for advancing particularly 
sophisticated techniques for the alignment of individuals’ wants with the 
state's interest.171  This is achieved, for example, when the state contracts 
out—delegates—regulatory powers to dominant economic actors, such 
as factory owners, with the expectation that they will not only be in 
charge of their employees’ work, but also their social ethics.172  As we 
have seen, this is a staple strategy of the Facilitator prototype. 
To complete the discussion, I turn to the Guardian type, which, put 
in Foucauldian terms, is typified by “pastoral power.”173  A distinct 
figure of a pastor stands at the center of this form of power:  the 
shepherd who, qua pastor, takes care of his flock as a whole while 
paying heed to “each and every” member of the flock.174  For “[n]ot only 
must he know where good pastures are, the seasons’ laws and the order 
of things; he must know each one’s particular needs.”175  The other side 
of the coin is sheep’s “permanent[]” submission to the pastor.176  This 
submission runs deep as the shepherd's individual treatment entails the 
shepherd’s penetrating, intimate knowledge of each sheep. 
There is a direct line stretching from early Christian theories of 
pastoral governance and seventeenth century doctrine of “police.”177  
Notice, first, that “police” stands here for something quite different from 
our common understanding of the term today.  It is not about a specific 
 
 170. See Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 137; David Garland, Governmentality and the 
Problem of Crime:  Foucault, Criminology, Sociology, 1 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1997). 
 171. Garland, supra note 170, at 175 (“Government is not . . . the suppression of individual 
subjectivity, but rather the cultivation of that subjectivity in specific forms, aligned to specific 
governmental aims.”). 
 172. See Gordon, supra note 169, at 26 (“Rather than seek to enforce order by encyclopaedic 
decree, the French government confers the de facto force of public law on the private jurisdiction of 
the entrepreneur.”). 
 173. See generally Gordon, supra note 165. 
 174. Michel Foucault, Politics and Reason, in MICHEL FOUCAULT:  POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, 
CULTURE 57, 67 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., 1988) [hereinafter Foucault, Politics and Reason]. 
 175. Id. at 62. 
 176. Id. at 69. 
 177. Gordon, supra note 169, at 8-12. 
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state mechanism or institution but rather a pervasive form of state 
operation which is informed by a particular disposition towards “men 
and things.”178  Foucault explains that the aim of this power is to ensure 
and promote the survival and prosperity of the state by fostering the 
well-being of its citizens.  It “foster[s] working and trading relations 
between men,” for example, but it does much more than that.179  Because 
“life is the object of the police,”180 it “sees to everything.”181  Simply 
put, pastoral (and police) power is about command and control.  
According to Foucault in The History of Sexuality, it necessarily 
involves “comprehensive regulations.”182  For that reason, pastoral 
power is most readily associated with—but not limited to—the Guardian 
type. 
D. Questions of Legitimacy 
Be their corresponding powers as they may, the undeniable fact that 
all regulators exercise some kind of power frequently looms large in 
public debates in the United States.  After all, suspicion of state power is 
a big deal in this country.  “In contrast to most of the rest of the world 
(including most democracies),” wrote Peter Schuck in Foundations of 
Administrative Law in 2004, “Americans have never been comfortable 
with the administrative state and have therefore always demanded that it 
be justified afresh.”183 
Americans have been grappling with the question of the legitimacy 
of administrative commissions at least since the Progressive Era.184  
 
 178. Id. at 10-14. 
 179. Foucault, Politics and Reason, supra note 174, at 79. 
 180. Id. at 81. 
 181. Id. at 80.  Elsewhere Foucault speaks of “Bio-Power,” which concerns the regulation of 
the human body for social ends (“the discipline:  an anatomo-politics of the human body”), and of 
the “species body” (“regulatory control:  a bio-politics of the population”).  See 1 MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 139-45 (1990) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY].  As pointed out by David Garland, “police” seems to include elements of both types of 
regulation. Garland, supra note 170, at 206 n.5.  I believe that the same holds for disciplinary 
power. 
 182. 1 FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 181, at 137. 
 183. PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2004). 
 184. See Freeman, supra note 53, at 546 (“[A]dministrative law scholarship has organized 
itself largely around the need to defend the administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy 
 . . . .”).  See similarly Bressman, supra note 100, at 461-62; Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic 
Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law (2005):  Article 1, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art1, and Adler, Justification, 
Legitimacy, and Administrative Governance, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, The Reformation of 
Administrative Law (2005):  Article 3, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art3 
[hereinafter Adler, Justification]. 
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Specifically, it is the exercise of discretion by “politically unresponsive 
administrators”185 that requires legitimacy.  Conceptual clarity is 
obviously important when issues of legitimacy are discussed.  Yet, it is 
often missing, since “[w]e often speak of legitimacy as if it were a 
single, undifferentiated phenomenon, goal, or ideal,”  Richard Fallon 
observed recently; he then went on to conclude, “It is not.”186  This is 
remarkable, given the fact that legal scholars have written relentlessly 
about the legitimacy of the administrative agency/state/government.187 
Useful in this respect is the tripartite division into legal, 
sociological, and moral legitimacy.188  Briefly, legal legitimacy is 
concerned with the lawfulness of an administrative action.189  
Sociological legitimacy is rooted in constituents’ actual, potentially 
empirically-verified, acceptance of the action, which is motivated by 
neither self-interest nor habit nor tradition.190  Moral legitimacy is 
dependent on its moral credentials, or “respect worthiness.”191 
 
 185. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
 186. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1851 (2005).  See also Yoo, supra note 156, at 776. (“Legitimacy is a word often used in our 
political debate, but seldom defined precisely.”). 
 187. For an influential critical survey, see Frug, supra note 19.  See also Buchanan, supra note 
118, at 691 (discussing the relations between the denominations “state” and “government” in the 
context of political legitimacy). 
 188. See Fallon, supra note 179, especially at 1790-1802, 1828.  See generally Adler, 
Justification, supra note 184.  To be sure, the three are “complexly interrelated in some cases.”  
Fallon, supra note 186, at 1791; see also Jack M. Balkin, Legitimacy and the 2000 Election, in 
BUSH V. GORE:  THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 214-18 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002). 
 189. Fallon, supra note 186, at 1794-95. 
 190. Max Weber is particularly responsible for the development of this category of de facto, or 
descriptive (sociological) legitimacy.  See, e.g., 1 WEBER, supra note 19, at 212-15.  For a critical 
analysis of Weber’s perception of various types of sociological legitimacy, see Craig Matheson, 
Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy, 38 BRIT. J. SOC. 199 (1987), and Alan Hyde, 
The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379. 
 191. Fallon, supra note 186, at 1796-1802, and Frank Michelman, Ida's Way:  Constructing the 
Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003).  It seems that 
administrative law scholars base their analysis of moral legitimacy on consent theory, which holds 
that political authority is legitimate if supported by the consent of those subject to its powers.  See, 
e.g., Richard Stewart, Reformation, supra note 76, at 1672 (mentioning, in the context of 
administrative law, “contractarian political theory . . . under which consent is the only legitimate 
basis for the exercise of the coercive power of government.”).  However, this view has been, and 
still is, under attack for various reasons.  See Tom Christiano, Authority, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2004), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entiries/authority/, 
which concludes that “neither consent nor tacit consent can stand alone as bases of political 
legitimacy.”  This is not an esoteric view.  See also, e.g., Adler, Beyond Efficiency, supra note 14, at 
256-57; A. JOHN SIMMONS, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY 122-
49 (2001). 
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The Guardian provides a good illustration of this typology.  This 
prototype envisages the regulator commanding an unruly industry, 
potentially—even paradigmatically—opposed to regulation.  As a result, 
sociological legitimacy is typically not meant to be the foundational 
source of legitimacy for regulation by the Guardian prototype.192  
Rather, the moral and other (i.e., morally-neutral but potentially useful) 
merits of the Guardian’s actions are thought to guarantee her 
legitimacy.193  The Guardian's raison d’être is to bring about a positive 
outcome in the name of (her view of) the public interest.  However, 
critics of the Guardian type argue that lack of constituents’ consent to a 
state action in itself deprives the regulator of moral legitimacy,194 even 
more so when such action is said to disproportionately benefit the 
regulatees/regulators/ruling political party.  The question of moral 
legitimacy, put in terms of democratic deficit or otherwise, is therefore a 
real challenge in the case of the Guardian, whereas—to take a contrary 
example—a Facilitator who is not backed by sociological legitimacy is 
inconceivable.  Indeed, sociological legitimacy is central in the latter 
case, as active, good-will participation of, and acceptance by, interested 
parties, are the Facilitators’ primary sources of legitimacy.195 
E. Institutional Framework 
As we have repeatedly seen, regulators’ leadership has a 
foundational role in the construction of the Guardian type.  This trait 
 
 192. Still, it is certainly conducive to the success of the Guardian.  But see SIMMONS, supra 
note 191, at 131-35, for a cogent argument for the validity of the division between moral and 
sociological legitimacy. 
 193. See generally id. 
 194. For sources on consent theories of legitimacy, supra note 191. 
 195. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Laura Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000).  Lastly, it should be noted that the role of the Technician is 
dependent on sociological and legal legitimacy.  First, the Technicians’ authority oftentimes rests on 
acceptance of officeholders’ reputed expertise or professionalism.  In that sense, Technicians’ 
legitimacy may be influenced by American society’s shifting attitudes towards the natural sciences 
and the recognized professions—and the two are obviously connected.  On public administration 
and professionalism, see, for example, WALDO, supra note 65, e.g., at 12, 20; and on 
professionalization in the United States, see PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM:  THE 
“OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 47-60 (1988), and DANIEL 
W. ROSSIDES, PROFESSIONS AND DISCIPLINES:  FUNCTIONAL AND CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (1998).  
Second, as for legal legitimacy:  the concept of legal legitimacy is associated with formalism.  See 
Fallon, supra note 186, at 1801-02.  There is an obvious connection between these two sources of 
legitimacy, as some versions of formalism are committed to the view of law as science and have 
strong affinity to perceptions of (legal) expertise and professionalism.  See Thomas C. Grey, 
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 225 (1992). 
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raises a problem.  It papers over the nitty-gritty operational aspects of 
administrative-processes and inculcates a bizarre image of a regulatory 
endeavor without an administrative apparatus.  To take one example, 
Herbert Croly did not see the paradox in championing a robust model of 
the Guardian,196 while unequivocally maintaining, “If the political 
experience of mankind has established anything, it has established the 
undesirability of ordinary bureaucratic government.”197 
The image of public regulation without regulatory bureaucracy—a 
key theme in the Guardian and Facilitator types—panders to an 
entrenched aversion to bureaucracy that transcends party lines in the 
Unites States.198  Faced with such negative sentiments towards 
bureaucracy, possibly even sharing them, progressive reformers had 
every interest in downplaying institutional aspects of regulation, at least 
when they were aware of them, if they were interested in advancing its 
legitimacy.  However, as regulation continued, many observers199 came 
to realize that portraying the regulator as a self-sufficient figure keeps 
major setbacks plaguing regulatory enterprises out of sight—to wit, as 
the aforementioned information problem.  It also pushes aside the fact 
that even the Guardian regulator, like all other regulators, is dependant 
not only on external, often political, constituency for her survival200 but 
also on internal cooperation. 
Well over fifty years ago, commentators had already come to 
perceive organizations as in a constant struggle between various internal, 
centrifugal and centripetal forces.  Abundant examples of divisive forces 
within organizations were recorded.  It was generally observed that 
employees’ personal preferences might get in the way of the process of 
administration—often, as devised by the Guardian201 (as noted, public-
 
 196. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 197. See CROLY, supra note 54, at 351. 
 198. See, e.g., Ernest Freund, Historical Survey, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 17-18 (1923); Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. 
PA. L. REV. 614, 617 (1927); ROSCOE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE, 
AND SIGNIFICANCE 35 (1942) (“Once established an absolute bureaucracy will not be easy to 
dethrone.”).  See generally Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal State and the Anti-Bureaucratic 
Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY:  CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 77 (Robert Eden ed., 
1989). 
 199. Including several former die-hard New Dealers.  See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits 
of the Administrative Process:  A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954); Jaffe, supra note 2; 
LANDIS, supra note 158. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50. 
 201. See SIMON, supra note 108, at 58 (“[The administrator] may (and usually will) have his 
own very definite set of personal values that he would like to see implemented by his administrative 
organization . . . .”). 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/3
8_SAGY_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOC 2/22/20112:13 PM 
2011] A TRIPTYCH OF REGULATORS 461 
choice theorists in particular have taken this insight to heart).  In 1958 
James March and Herbert Simon stipulated that “individual members of 
an organization come to it with a prior structure of preferences—a 
personality, if you like—on the basis of which they make decisions 
while in the organization.”202  March, Simon, and others also studied 
conflicts among individuals in the organization and among 
organizational units—each keenly fighting for its turf—that may impact 
employees’ output and their motivation to abide by their superior’s 
directives.203 
Also noted were the disruptive tendencies of professionalization in 
the present context.  “Professionalization implies specific formal training 
and thus substantial homogeneity of background. It implies formal 
regulation of job performance . . . . [Therefore,] [t]o the extent that a job 
is professionalized, techniques and standards of performance are defined 
by the other members of the profession,” rather than by the organization 
in which the employee (regularly, a Technician) works.204 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, at least in some cases, 
disciplining the Technician may prove more difficult than it seems.  To 
begin with, from an organizational point of view, the Technician is often 
the Guardian’s unequal counterpart.205  Tensions between the two may 
abound.  Whereas the latter’s position of leadership would push her to 
strive for integration, the former’s intolerance for outside intrusion on 
her turf may push for a Balkanization of the organization.  
Professionalism and the attendant asymmetric information between the 
bureaucracy’s different echelons may play a large hand in this 
dynamic.206  “There is, in fact, no expert group,” Harold Laski wrote in 
 
 202. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 114, at 65. 
 203.  See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 82, at 173 (noting the “institutionalized conflict” between 
the FTC's lawyers’ unit (the Bureau of Competition) and the Bureau of Economics, but concluding 
that it “probably resulted in more enlightened decisions.”).  See also KATZMANN, supra note 148, at 
180-87; Larry B. Parker et al., Clean Air Act Allowance Trading, 21 ENVTL. L. 2021, 2065-67 
(1991) (noting inter-agency tensions on the federal level as well as tensions between federal and 
state comparable environmental regulation agencies).  See also Louis De Alessi, An Economic 
Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation:  Theory and Evidence from the Electric Power 
Industry, 19 PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1974). 
 204. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 112, at 70, 161; LARSON, supra note 47, at 211-12; 
KATZMANN, supra note 148, at 179.  Some speak in this context of regulators’ (international and 
national) “epistemic communities.”  See Peter M. Haas, Introduction:  Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field 
of International Administrative Law:  Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 425 (2002) 
(“Scholars have described how transgovernmental networks of regulators have developed and now 
exercise considerable regulatory power.”). 
 205. The Technician may also be the Facilitator’s counterpart, of course. 
 206. See supra text accompanying note 204-08, 295-98. 
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1930, “which does not tend to deny that truth may possibly be found 
outside the boundary of its private Pyrenees.”207  Of course, this in itself 
does not bode well for inter-agency collaboration. 
In sum, due to growing professionalization and specialization of 
agents within most administrative organizations, principals (regularly, 
Guardians) are not always able to effectively direct their agents (usually 
Technicians).208  Add to this dynamic administrators’ necessary reliance 
on the backing of external, political and other, elements and the 
emerging picture is of a precarious, fragmented administrative process.  
This picture stands in stark contrast to the image of regulation created by 
the Facilitator and Guardian types. 
Having concluded a detailed description of the three prototypes of 
regulators, revealing their more and less benign characteristics (see 
Table 2), I now demonstrate their handiwork mainly in contemporary 
schemes of environmental regulation.  As noted, I focus on 
environmental regulation, since it has long become a fertile grazing 
ground for regulatory novelties in the United States.209 
 
Table 2:  Axes of Analysis 
 
 
 Facilitator Guardian Technician 
Method of 
Handling of 
Information 
Collaborative Self-sufficient “Externally” 
structured 
Who defines 
the Public 
Interest (& for 
Whom)? 
Participating 
parties 
(themselves) 
The regulator 
(the “general 
public”) 
The profession 
and regulators’ 
supervisors (as 
directed) 
 
 207. Laski, supra note 2, at 103.  See similarly United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 
F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953). 
 208. On the principal-agent relationship and the role of asymmetrical information in that 
relationship, see generally, for example, John F. Padgett, Hierarchy and Ecological Control in 
Federal Budgetary Decision Making, 87 AM. J. SOC.75 (1981); Croley, supra note 22, at 23-25; 
McCubbins et al., supra note 107.  As these sources clarify, the principal-agent problem applies in 
all levels of the regulatory process (for example, constituents-legislator; legislator-regulator; etc.). 
 209. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental 
Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 171 (“At present, there is a remarkable burst of interest in 
‘rethinking’ or ‘reinventing’ the next generation of environmental regulations.”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Triangulating the Future of Reinvention:  Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (2000) (declaring that “[r]einvention is all the rage today,” and that 
it “is here to stay”); BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
(1995), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30367. 
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Mode of Power Security Pastoral Disciplinary 
Leading Source 
of Legitimacy 
Sociological 
(Acceptance/ 
cooperation) 
Moral 
(Leadership) 
Legal 
(Professionalism) 
Institutional 
Setting 
“Town hall” “One-man 
show”
Hierarchical 
 
IV.  THE TYPES IN ACTION 
A. Reflexive Markets:  Facilitator 
Adams’s tenets have shown great persistency and can be traced in 
contemporary analyses of regulation.  In fact, it appears that the last 
generation of administrative law scholarship and practice saw a full-
blown renaissance of the Facilitator archetype—with some 
modifications, of course, one of which is worth noting at the outset:  
whereas Adams focused on transportation, the prototype is currently 
more associated with environmental law.  The fact that the field of 
environmental regulation shares foundational elements with the work of 
an end-of-the-nineteenth-century reformer is revealing.  It certainly 
sheds a new light on some of the contemporary theoretical and practical 
“innovations” in that field.210 
A clear example of the Facilitator paradigm in the new wave of 
environmental regulation is given by “reflexive law.”211  Briefly, 
reflexive law focuses on attaining a fit between social and private goals 
through voluntary means and keeps one degree of separation from 
directly mandating specific environmentally-responsible conduct.212  It 
seeks to enlist what might be called, borrowing Foucault’s terminology, 
“disciplinary” mechanisms213 in the service of “privatized,” or one might 
say democratic, regulation. 
 
 210. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 21, 36 (2001) [hereinafter Stewart, New Generation] (“[M]any of the notable innovations 
in administrative law over the past three decades have occurred in environmental cases.”); Gillette 
& Krier, supra note 84, at 1042 (“Many of the public risks that figure so prominently in the ongoing 
debate are simply the most recent generation of environmental problems.”). 
 211. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:  The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 346 (2004) [hereinafter The Renew Deal]. 
 212. See generally Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983); Orts, supra note 7. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
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Noting the growing, even potentially constitutive, role played by 
various organizations in the lives of many in the West,214 and 
recognizing the need to “promote the internalization of environmental 
norms by firms and other organizational actors as opposed to directly 
controlling their external conduct,” reflexive law reaches out to 
institutions outside the legal system with a view to enhancing their “self-
referential capacities.”215 
The means to achieve reflexive law’s objectives is primarily 
through the deployment of an array of incentives designed to induce 
organizations and those running them to internalize desirable 
environment-protecting norms as the norms and goals of the 
organization itself.  Of note is the fact that such schemes of self-
regulation may rely not only on third-party monitoring—a technique that 
may be implicated in different styles of regulation216—but even on 
various processes of (firm or industry) self-policing.217 
The EPA’s longstanding “Audit Policy,” incorporated in its notice 
Incentives for Self-Policing, provides an excellent example of reflexive 
environmental regulation.  This policy seeks to “encourag[e] regulated 
entities to voluntarily discover, promptly disclose and expeditiously 
correct violations of Federal environmental requirements.”218  The nub 
of the program is leniency in penalty in return for voluntary disclosure of 
violations.  Needless to say, certain restrictions apply and prerequisites 
must be met:  notably, violations are expected to be traced through an 
internal monitoring system, which could be part of regulatees’ 
EMSs219—to which I now turn. 
 
 214. See generally Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, supra note 108. 
 215. Orts, supra note 7, at 1232.  See generally Stewart, New Generation, supra note 210, at 
127-51.  See also Orts, supra, at 1231-32, 1252-68.  As we have seen, Foucault spoke of the rise of 
the power of “security” with reference to similar developments in the liberal state.  See supra notes 
168-172 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Freeman, supra note 53, at 648-51; Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 52, at 717-18. 
 217. See, e.g., Richard E. Schwartz et al., Encouraging Self-Auditing Within the Pork Industry:  
The Nationwide Clean Water Act Enforcement Agreement for Agriculture's First Industry-Wide 
Environmental Auditing Program, 29 ENVTL L. REP. 10395 (1999). 
 218. Incentives for Self-Policing:  Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations 65, Fed. Reg. 19618, 19618 (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 
EPA Incentives for Self-Policing].  On environmental auditing, see Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. 
Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365-75 (1992); 
Keith M. Casto, Environmental Audits:  Barriers, Opportunities and a Recommendation, 5 
HASTINGS W. N. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 233 (1999); Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and 
Environmental Protection:  Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 
(2004). 
 219. EPA Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 218, at 19625.  This EPA’s Statement of 
Policy stipulates (id. §  D.) that it applies when “[t]he violation was discovered” in one of two ways:  
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Indeed, EMSs are another case of reflexive law in environmental 
regulation.  An EMS, as defined in one of the growing number of 
publications dedicated to the subject, is a “continual cycle of planning, 
implementing, reviewing, and improving the processes and actions that 
an organization undertakes to meet its environmental obligations.”220  It 
has a more comprehensive structure than that of environmental audits.  
An EMS seeks to instill environmentally-conscious thinking in the 
organization’s every-day business.221  Although directed to the 
management level, it is meant to encompass all organization members, at 
all levels of production.  Expectedly, the EPA had developed EMSs for 
many of its facilities.222  In fact, President Clinton issued a special 
Executive Order, Greening the Government Through Leadership in 
Environmental Management, requiring all government agencies to 
follow suit.223  In a Position Statement released at the end of 2005, 
Stephen Johnson, the previous EPA Administrator, declared that the 
“EPA will promote voluntary adoption of EMSs.  To encourage 
voluntary adoption of EMSs, EPA will rely on public education and 
voluntary programs.”224  This statement—a quintessential exemplar of 
reflexive law in action—assigns the role of the Facilitator to the EPA. 
Information-generating strategies, much in vogue of late, are also at 
the forefront of reflexive law.225  These strategies include non-
 
first, through “[a]n environmental audit,” that is “a systematic, documented, periodic and objective 
review by regulated entities of facility operations . . .”; second, through a “compliance management 
system.”  Id.  The essentials of the latter system are covered by the discussion about EMSs.  See 
supra note 7 and accompanying text; see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text (to recall, 
EMSs are Environmental Management Systems).  By all indications, the EPA is fully committed to 
the advancement of this program.  See Memorandum, Issuance of “Audit Policy”:  Frequently 
Asked Questions (Apr. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/incentives/auditing/2007-faqs.pdf. 
 220. STAPLETON & GLOVER, supra note 7, at 8.  Similarly, the EPA offers, among other things, 
a web-based course that “provides an overview of environmental management systems (EMS) and 
how [the program] can support environmental improvements at facilities that are subject to 
environmental regulations.”  See Waste – Information Resources, EPA (last updated May 1, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/ems/ems-101. 
 221. See Orts, supra note 7, at 1275-87.  See also Christine Todd Whitman, EPA’s 
Environmental Management System Implementation Policy, (May 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id=601&destination=ShowIte
m. 
 222. See Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 5664-65 
(U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter EPA Position Statement]. 
 223. Exec. Order No. 13,148, 65 Fed. Reg. 24595 (Apr. 21, 2000), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
 224. EPA Position Statement, supra note 222, at 5665. 
 225. See Sunstein, supra note 106, at 617-18.  See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-
Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
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governmental labeling programs, which identify environmentally-
friendly products (e.g., “Green Seal”),226 and government-imposed 
disclosure duties of harmful characteristics of products and business 
activities (e.g., labels on cigarettes).227  The basic idea behind these 
programs is that information is likely to advance internal and external 
transparency,228 “allow consumers to make informed choices,”229 and 
generate self-reflexive processes both inside and outside of 
organizations.230  For example, it may lead to (independent or reactive) 
business self-disciplining once externalities are made apparent.231 
This cursory excursion should suffice to convey a sense of the 
Facilitator-like role which reflexive law assigns to the regulator.232  It 
 
AND THE US 293-321(G. de Búrca & J. Scott eds., 2006) [hereinafter LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE]; David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. 
POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 155 (2006). 
 226. See Orts, supra note 7, at 1248-50. 
 227. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to Reduce Lead Exposure with One Simple Statute:  
The Experience of Proposition 65, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10581 (1999). 
 228. See Weil et al., supra note 225, at 155-56. 
 229. Waxman, supra note 12, at 1803.  This comment was made by Representative Henry A. 
Waxman while introducing the CAA’s 1990 Amendments, which included a labeling program.  See 
id. at 1803-04, and 42 U.S.C. § 7671j (2006). 
 230. But see infra Section III.A. (detailing contemporary behavioral theorists’ conclusions 
about human cognitive biases in analyzing information). 
 231. See generally Sunstein, supra note 106, at 613-26.  Related to this development is the 
parallel imposition of disclosure duties on governmental bodies.  See, e.g., The Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  See generally McCubbins et al., supra note 107, at 259-60, 
264-66.  Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), government organs (and recipients 
of governmental funding or regulatory approval) are required to issue Environmental Impact 
Statements (42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)).  See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes:  NEPA Lessons for 
the New Property, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1680-84 (1993). 
 232. In addition to reflexive law, another notable natural habitat of modern Facilitators is found 
in the contemporary cottage industry of participatory/pluralist models of the administrative process, 
commonly grouped under the heading of “new governance.”  See generally Lobel, The Renew Deal, 
supra note 211; Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 225.  Jody Freeman is a leading voice in this strand of literature.  
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1997).  Freeman’s description of a “collaborative model” draws on EPA’s past experience, inter 
alia, with negotiated rulemaking.  On this and similar techniques of regulation, see Philip J. Harter, 
Negotiating Regulations:  A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Philip J. Harter, Fear of 
Commitment:  An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389 (1997).  Of note is the fact that the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act actually specifically authorized agencies to employ a “facilitator,” that 
is, “a person who impartially aids in the discussions and negotiations among the members of a 
negotiated rulemaking committee to develop a proposed rule” (5 U.S.C. §§ 562, 568 (1994)).  As 
these sources demonstrate, examples of Facilitator-style regulation are amply found also outside of 
the area of environmental regulation.  See also MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT:  
CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 103-07 (2000).  Thus, as 
further examples of Facilitators in action, consider the following:  (1) key aspects in the regulation 
of training and career services provided under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 (29 
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appears that Charles Francis Adams’s model of weak regulation has, 
posthumously, found its matching concept of law. 
B. Back to the New Deal:  Guardian 
To this day, it seems lawyers in particular persist in their 
attachment to the Guardian.  For instance, in their Clean Coal/Dirty 
Air,233 Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler canvass what seems to 
them as a colossal debacle on the part of the federal government to 
satisfactorily regulate sulfur dioxide (SO2) discharge from coal-burning 
power plants.  In putting forward a remedial measure the authors revert 
to the “New Deal ideal”234 of “an independent and expert administrative 
agency creatively regulating a complex social problem in the public 
interest.”235  Isolated from politics and “unencumbered by abstract 
legalisms”236 it would “promise[] to craft a policy responsive to the 
complexities of environmental relationships.”237 
Justice Breyer also harks back to the “traditional New Deal notion 
of delegating broad, general legal authority to administrative  
bodies. . . .”238  He advocates the establishment of a “central bureaucratic 
group,”239 granted with inter-agency jurisdiction and ample authority, 
whose mission would be “building an improved, coherent risk-regulating 
system . . . .”240  Reverting to Lindblom’s terminology,241 it can be said 
that according to Breyer’s recipe, this “central group” would be well 
positioned to take a synoptic outlook, thanks to its centralized position 
and wide database, “which automatically extends beyond a single 
program . . . .”242 
 
U.S.C. § 2801 (2000)).  See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 211, at 410-13; (2) Various 
“outreach activities” of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, such as the 
Strategic Partnership Program, which is “designed to assist firms in integrating lessons from 
multiple worksites by creating partnerships of groups of employers, employees, employee 
representatives, as well as educational institutions.”  Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational Safety in 
the United States, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 225, at 277. 
 233. BRUCE ACKERMAN &WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
 234. Id. at 12. 
 235. Id. at 1. 
 236. Id. at 12. 
 237. Id.  For a critique of this prescription, see Latin, supra note 1, at 1284-86, 1297-1301. 
 238. BREYER, supra note 21, at 80. 
 239. Id. at 63. 
 240. Id. at 60.  Latin characterizes Breyer’s analysis as “idealized” for not fully considering 
how the current administrative system actually works and what real-life implementation constraints 
are associated with environmental regulation.  Latin, supra note 1, at 1301-04. 
 241. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 242. BREYER, supra note 21, at 75.  See also JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 226-
27 (1983) (advising the formation of a “superbureau” in the Social Security Administration).  
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Completing a staple description of the Guardian, Breyer admits to 
his skepticism of the desirability of public participation in the dealings 
of this central group.  He holds that “the group must have a degree of 
political insulation to withstand various political pressures, particularly 
in respect to individual substances, that emanate from the public directly 
or through Congress and other political sources.”243 
As these analyses suggest, the allure of the Guardian is still strong 
and is likely to figure in any future configuration of public regulation.  
Indeed, it is hard to imagine the Guardian being completely removed 
from the administrative state. 
As noted, a prime example of the Guardian type in the current 
administrative state is to be found in the epicenter of environmental 
regulation, the NAAQS, which lies at the heart of the CAA.  Although it 
was radically revised in 1990,244 the amended Act still designated to the 
Agency the management of the NAAQS.245  “These standards,” noted 
Representative Henry Waxman246 shortly after the 1990 Amendments 
were made into law, “are the cornerstone of the CAA’s pollution control 
programs.”247 
So wide was the authority granted the EPA by this law, the D.C. 
Circuit held it unconstitutional.  It found the relevant provision did not 
provide any “intelligible principle” to guide the EPA in the 
determination of air quality standards, as required by the nondelegation 
doctrine.248  Although the Supreme Court demurred and reversed, it did 
note that the authority to “set[] air standards . . . affect[s] the entire 
national economy,” and characterized it as a “sweeping regulatory 
scheme[].”249  Particularly illustrative is the Court’s summation of the 
“intelligible principle” contained in the Act.  The Court did not give a 
 
Breyer posits further along the same lines that conditions should be arranged and the right staff 
recruited so the group does not become “overly ‘proceduralist’ or ‘lawyer-like.’”  BREYER, supra 
note 21, at 74.  See similarly LANDIS, supra note 21, at 75. 
 243. BREYER, supra note 21, at 60-61 (emphasis in original).  Here, too, Breyer is walking in 
the footsteps of Landis.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 99.  
 244. The CAA was then amended, inter alia, pursuant to a growing frustration in Congress with 
the EPA’s languor in implementing the CAA. See Waxman, supra note 12, at 1746, 1757, 1774. 
 245. For the NAAQS, see also sources mentioned supra note 6. 
 246. See supra note 12. 
 247. Waxman, supra note 12, at 1756. 
 248. Trucking Ass’n. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir 1999), rev’d, Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  This part of the D.C. Circuit’s decision pertains to §  
109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set “ambient air quality standards . . . the attainment and 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the [EPA] Administrator, based on [the] criteria 
[documents of § 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public 
health.”  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).  See also Am. Trucking Ass’n., 175 F.3d at 1057. 
 249. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001). 
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positive definition of an intelligible principle; all the Court could say 
was that the EPA should not consider the cost of achieving air quality 
standards “at the level that is ‘requisite’ [–] that is, not lower or higher 
than is necessary [–] to protect the public health with an adequate margin 
of safety . . . .”250  This open-ended formulation, describing a nation-
wide scheme of regulation entrusting an issue as crucial as public health 
to the hands of a regulator, bespeaks of the Guardian.  At the same time, 
in light of this formulation it is understandable why the specter of 
unbridled discretion, essentially of illegitimacy, often haunts Guardian-
led regulation. 
The EPA’s leading role in the direction of enforcement of federal 
environmental law goes beyond the CAA, of course, and applies to all 
major environmental legislation.251  Generally, the EPA has wide 
discretion to decide whether violations of this legislation should be 
treated administratively, criminally, or through civil penalties.252  The 
EPA likewise sets the policy for the settlement of civil judicial and 
administrative actions that fall in its jurisdiction.253 
Before we move on, it is important to note that one domain 
particularly reserved for Guardian-style regulation is the business of 
regulators regulating (other) regulators.  At issue here are several 
 
 250. Id. at 475-76. 
 251. Additional interesting examples of less sweeping policies advanced in a Guardian-style 
regulation by the EPA are provided by Richard Stewart.  See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 
210, at 54-60, 68-73.  These include the numerous instances of “adaptive implementation” of 
environmental legislation (also known as “slippage”), and policies relating to Brownfields 
redevelopments.  See id.  Management-based regulation, in which regulators assume the mantle of 
“meta-manager[s],” characteristically also follows the lines of Guardian-style regulation.  See 
Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 52, at 713.  As demonstrated by Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, 
this type of regulation furnishes examples of Guardian regulation in such varied fields as food and 
industrial safety as well as pollution prevention.  See generally id.  For comparable examples of 
Guardian-style, management-based regulation in the field of education, see James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights 
Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1703-49 (2003), and James Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No 
Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 932-89 (2004).  For possible Guardian-run regulation 
in fields of health- and consumer-protection, see Sugarman, supra note 52. 
 252. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 931-73 (2003). 
 253. See, e.g., Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy (March 1, 1995), available 
at  http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/cwapol.pdf; RICHARD REVESZ, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1036-37 (2008).  The EPA is not alone of course in enforcing 
federal environmental legislation.  The Department of Justice obviously has a foundational role in 
this, see, e.g., William Tucker, The Manacled Octopus:  The Unitary Executive and EPA 
Enforcement Policy Involving Federal Agencies, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149 (2005), as do other 
branches of the federal government.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 24.100 (2007) (setting forth the Secretary 
of Labor’s whistle-blower regulations in the area of environmental law). 
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important measures adopted by the Executive and Congress in an effort 
to reign in the various federal agencies by requiring them to demonstrate 
that their proposed policies pass the test of (economic or environmental) 
rationality.254  The supervisory power granted to the President’s Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), particularly since President 
Reagan’s administration, is a leading example for the imposition of cost-
effective and cost-benefit principles on new regulations throughout the 
federal government.  OMB requirements apply to all major regulation, 
environmental and other.255  Focusing again on environmental 
regulation, Environmental Impact Statements that the EPA (and others) 
are required to issue under NEPA provide a comparative example, this 
one passed by Congress, of a measure designed to direct regulators’ 
discretion.256 
The addition of OMB and similar meta-regulation to the regulatory 
scene reveals that the EPA Administrator (for example) is, at least in 
some circumstances, Janus-faced:  a Technician when facing the 
OMB257 and a Guardian when facing the industry and the rest of the 
Agency.258 
C. Bookkeeping Chores:  Technician 
The sine qua non of successful enforcement is effective monitoring 
and detection of violations.  Generally, this often-tricky task falls in the 
hands of Technicians.259  Less trivial contemporary elaboration of the 
Technician prototype can be found within the burgeoning field of 
market-based regulatory measures.  This category includes a host of 
regulatory instruments presented as more cost-effective and cost-
conscious than the extant command system.  These instruments are 
generally said to allow for more flexibility, encourage the development 
of beneficial innovations, and ultimately induce better performance of 
environmental regulatory systems.260 
Endorsing the latter approach, Terry Anderson and Donald Leal 
advocate “free market environmentalism,” which relies on the allocation 
 
 254. See generally Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics:  The Transformation of 
American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 745-77 (1996). 
 255. See generally Lazarus, supra note 42, at 328-58. 
 256. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 210, at 40-42.  See generally id. at 38-54. 
 257. In that case, the OMB is the Guardian. 
 258. For similar duality in the enforcement of environmental legislation when the EPA and 
other federal agencies are involved, see Tucker, supra note 253. 
 259. See generally PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 252, at 932-35. 
 260. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 210, at 94 ff. 
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of property rights—by legislation—in environmentally sensitive areas in 
the hope that rights’ owners would protect these rights in the most 
effective manner.261  Now, in order for the proposed regime to be 
effective a central recording system would have to be put in place.262  
The routine maintenance of such a system is normally in the purview of 
the Technician. 
Other programs may assume that Technician regulators have more 
leeway than under free market environmentalism.  As noted, a regulatory 
regime relying on permits, such as the Clean Water Act’s NPDES,263 
may naturally be managed by Technicians, even though the granting of 
permits is not necessarily a mechanical operation.  In any event, several 
reasons support the argument that under the NPDES the Technician is 
the appropriate type of administrator to issue permits.  One, once the 
system is put in place by the Administrator, including setting guidelines 
and addressing overall policy questions,264 the scope of discretion a 
permit-issuer is expected to exercise is relatively limited and her task 
likewise quite technical.265  Additionally, it is clear that the statute 
envisages this operation taking place within a bureaucratic structure.  
Finally, as noted, the Technician’s most natural regulatory tool is a 
permit.266 
The Technician type seems to be in full bloom nowadays and is 
likely to prosper further in the area of environmental protection in the 
future.  The reason for this is clear enough.  Congress’ frustration with 
what it regards as the EPA’s failures to meet statutory benchmarks267 has 
led to “a general trend in environmental statues . . . toward ever-greater 
 
 261. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political 
Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 297 (1992).  For powerful critique and 
endorsement of Free Market Environmentalism, see Edward Brunet, Debunking Wholesale Private 
Enforcement of Environmental Rights, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 311 (1992) and James L. 
Huffman, Protecting the Environment from Orthodox Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 349 (1992), respectively.  In any event, as of 1995 at least it was “the hottest growth industry 
in environmental law.”  Orts, supra note 7, at 1241. 
 262. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 210, at 103-04.  Under such scheme, courts 
would play a central role in a regime dependant on private enforcement.  See Brunet, supra note 
261. 
 263. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
 264. See CWA § 304 (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (2006); CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, Administrator, EPA, 430 U.S. 112, 130-32 (1977); and 
WILLIAM RODGERS, supra note 11, at 406-11.  Development of effluent limitations has proven to be 
much longer and much more arduous than anticipated by Congress.  In fact, it is doubtful whether 
EPA has completed this duty to this day.  See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 252, at 620-24, 630-31. 
 265. For the EPA’s process of permit review, see supra notes 10-11. 
 266. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 267. See supra note 244. 
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specificity.”  Consequently, Michael Herz goes on to note in his study of 
NEPA,268 the EPA “in particular . . . [is] left less and less discretion in 
their regulatory capacity . . . .”269  In such a restrictive environment, 
Technicians and their technical skills are in high demand.270 
V. BRINGING THE TYPES TO BOOK 
The analysis in the previous two Parts aimed not only to chart the 
contours of the three types, but also to point out, or at least allude to, a 
few characteristics liable to hamper the types’ ability to function well 
and/or prevent them from maintaining an acceptable level of fairness.271  
To be sure, many of these factors are not new.  Still, it is useful to put 
them in the context of prototypes, which outline a comprehensive 
framework within which the regulator operates, for such 
contextualization renders them more concrete and clarifies the 
difficulties they pose. 
Although not exhaustive, the resulting list of thorny issues that are 
part and parcel of every regulatory scheme (for example, common 
failures in information handling) may be helpful in the evaluation of 
administrative actions in general, even outside of the context of the 
types.  One does not have to treat the ideal types as “ideal” in order to 
appreciate the perspective offered by the ideal-type analysis conducted 
in the present study. 
The following discussion will therefore take each prototype of 
regulator on its own terms.272  Following the previous discussion, I will 
 
 268. On NEPA, see supra note 231. 
 269. Herz, supra note 231, at 1734.  On the likely tightening of executive control of agencies in 
the future, see Stewart, Twenty-First Century, supra note 1, at 453. 
 270. Examples of Technician-style regulation outside of the field of environmental regulation 
include the following:  (1) Regulators’ duties in the maintenance of various voucher programs, for 
example, under the WIA (see supra note 211; Nan Ellis, Individual Training Accounts Under the 
Workforce Investment Act of 1998:  Is Choice a Good Thing?, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
235 (2001)) and in several states’ school systems (e.g., Henry M. Levin & Clive R. Belfield, The 
Marketplace in Education, 27 REV. RES. EDUC. 183 (2003)) (2) Regulators’ inspection duties under 
various schemes of management-based regulation, for example, under the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s regulatory strategy entitled “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points.” 
Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 52, at 717. 
 271. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 148, at 399 (outlining the goals that should guide a reform in 
environmental regulation:  effectiveness, efficiency, maintenance of “essential democratic values of 
our society,” and fairness). 
 272. Put differently, the analysis to follow brackets off “external” considerations—for 
example, whether the specific prototype is the right answer to a pending problem—in reviewing 
how to prevent proverbial sources of concern from becoming malignant. 
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focus on information, power, legitimacy, and institutional considerations 
throughout the following concluding survey. 
1.  Facilitator 
As noted, sociological legitimacy is the central concern in this 
case.273  The first line of attack should be, therefore, guaranteeing 
genuine participation in administrative processes conducted under the 
auspices of a Facilitator.274  This entails, among other things, conducting 
a critical examination of whom the participating stakeholders are and 
whether steps are being taken to render their participation meaningful.275  
Relevant questions, among others, include:  “Are shareholders treated 
equally?” and just as crucial, “Who is left out?” 
A Facilitator’s consensus building efforts might not deter an 
outsider—indeed, they might encourage her—to question their 
outcomes, notably on the ground they are not warranted by the 
Facilitator’s enabling legislation.276  It is not difficult to imagine how the 
free-flow nature of reinvented processes might produce creative, yet 
illegal, compromises, and why agencies that have labored to reach a 
consensus would be reluctant to then blow the whistle.277 
Information is the Facilitator’s best friend.  Without the collection 
and dissemination of information her impact is moot.  However, contrary 
to what Charles Francis Adams thought in the later nineteenth century, 
one could have too much information, and therein likes the rub.278  As 
we have seen, this is just one item on a long list of counter-intuitive 
ways in which humans process information (within and without 
deliberative settings) that has come to light in the past few decades.279  
 
 273. See supra Section III.D. 
 274. If the Facilitator’s sole role is to provide information to the public—as prescribed by 
Charles Francis Adams—“participation” denotes the opportunity to present information to the 
agency.  See supra Section II.A. 
 275. See Wald, supra note 121; Philip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory 
Negotiations—A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51 (1986). 
 276. William Funk provides a concrete example.  See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your 
Eyes:  Regulatory Negotiations and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 
55 (1987). 
 277. See Freeman, supra note 232, at 83 (“Some critics worry that collaborative processes 
might be vehicles through which agencies, industry, and powerful public interest groups can collude 
to undermine the public interest.”).  Former EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus, supra note 150, at 
400, makes it clear that as he sees it, “the only way to make [a consensus process] work, is that all 
participants have to understand that the process is the entire and exclusive theatre for decisions . . . . 
There will be no appeal, and no way to weasel out of the deal.” 
 278. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 424-25. 
 279. See supra Section III.A. 
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This information problem is a consideration worth keeping in mind in 
reviewing the Facilitator’s handiwork. 
Finally, power:  viewed through a Foucauldian prism, Adams’s 
intentions notwithstanding, the Facilitator is certainly not a “weak” 
regulator.  As illustrated by reflexive law, disciplinary power may be 
exerted by the Facilitator in abundance in her efforts to advance 
environmental-friendly self-regulation.280  Reflexive law illustrates 
further that disciplinary power is often involved in Facilitator-run 
regulation; but it also demonstrates that other forms of power may 
concurrently be at work, notably, what Foucault called “security.”281  
Thinking of Facilitator-run projects in Foucauldian terms thus exposes 
otherwise less visible coercive mechanisms involved even in the type’s 
seemingly most hands-off regulatory schemes. 
2.  Guardian 
Fundamentally, the reign of the Guardian does not rely on its 
consensual acceptance;282 and, as our short excursion into the 
nondelegation doctrine in the context of the NAAQS283 revealed, nor 
does it rely on adherence to traditional rule-of-law precepts.284  That in 
itself is alarming under liberal political philosophy, for it raises acute 
concerns of boundless discretion and arbitrary power that is sure to come 
in its wake.  Still, as noted, on its own terms when it comes to the 
Guardian, the leading concern is moral legitimacy.285 
As we have seen, the Guardian is expected to be active in most 
stages of the administrative process, including the gathering and 
analyzing of information.  In her search for information the Guardian is 
less restrained than the other types; she is neither as reliant on 
stakeholders’ submissions of data as the Facilitator, nor as narrow in the 
scope of her interest in regulatory issues as the Technician.  Unlike with 
the other two types, the logic of the Guardian’s design allows her to self-
sufficiently devise policy and “spin[] out of [her] own guts a continuing 
 
 280. Think here of the EPA’s EMSs “management kits” offered to businesses to advance their 
environmental-conscious behavior.  See supra text accompanying notes 7, 212-17. 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 168-72. 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 192. 
 283. See supra text accompanying note 248-50. 
 284. As evidenced in the convoluted nondelegation doctrine.  See, e.g., sources cited supra 
note 48. 
 285. See supra text accompanying note 194.  It goes beyond the scope of this study, of course, 
to investigate what principles should guide us in evaluating regulatory goals’ moral credentials.  For 
an example of such investigation, see Adler, supra note 14. 
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/3
8_SAGY_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOC 2/22/20112:13 PM 
2011] A TRIPTYCH OF REGULATORS 475 
series of miraculous solutions.”286  Hence, the Guardian archetype may 
be troubling to those who think the scheme raises serious problems of 
democratic legitimacy,287 are fearful of unchecked administrative 
discretion,288 and take seriously cognitive errors in information 
processing.  Others may also resent this prototype’s obliviousness to the 
Guardian’s institutional working environment for they know that 
regulation can never be a one man show:  the Guardian is reliant on 
politicians, interest groups, judges, other administrators both inside and 
outside of her own organization, her colleagues, and a host of 
Technicians.289 
3. Technician 
Disciplinary power is fully implicated in Technician regulation, 
even when it is “merely” directed to bookkeeping and other small-scale, 
technical chores.  This modality of power is first exerted on the 
regulated industry and doubly on the Technician-regulator herself.  As 
already so often emphasized, the Technician is a professional on the 
condition that she is authoritatively recognized as such by her peers.  
Moreover, as an administrator she is always a part of a hierarchical 
structure, laboring in the bowels of a bureaucracy. 
The resultant matrix creates ample opportunities for “regulating the 
regulators,”290 but also for diminution of professionalism in 
government.291  Surprisingly, although visibly powerful and highly 
consequential, OMB review along with other comparable measures of 
executive or congressional supervision292 does not appear to comply 
with rule-of-law norms of transparency and accountability, especially as 
many of them are in practice immune from judicial review.293 
Lastly, I turn again to professionalization, this time from a more 
skeptical perspective.  We have noted that several observers point at 
professionalization’s tendency to hamper inter- and intra-agency 
 
 286. This remark was made critically by Jaffe in Agencies in Perspective, supra note 143, at 
567 (emphasis added).  Jaffe thought “absurd and a-historical” the “notion so sedulously cultivated 
by many of us during New Deal days that agencies, because they were expert, could go on spinning 
out of their own guts a continuing series of miraculous solutions.” 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85. 
 288. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 76, at 1671-88. 
 289. See supra Section III.B.2. 
 290. See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423 (1996). 
 291. See Waxman, supra note 12, at 1744-45. 
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48, 255. 
 293. See Stewart, New Generation, supra note 210, at 39-63. 
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collaboration.294  But this is not all:  it is further pointed out that the 
professionalization of the administrative process has the additional 
negative side effect of breeding disciplinary parochialism and thus “the 
perspective of totality is lost.”295  In making this claim, scholars, such as 
Marver Bernstein,296 March, Simon,297 and Louis Jaffe,298surface a 
consideration worth keeping in mind when evaluating a Technician-run 
regulation.  As they conceive it, professionalism, or specialized 
expertise, is based on a focus on only one aspect of phenomenal reality, 
rather than on a balanced, panoramic outlook—which is often a 
perquisite for regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article exposed and explored three inclusive prototypes of 
public regulators embedded in past and present literature on federal 
regulation in the United States.  The discussion in the Article aimed not 
only to chart the contours of the types, but also to point out a few 
characteristics liable to hamper their ability to function well and/or 
prevent them from maintaining an acceptable level of fairness.  To be 
sure, many of these factors are not new.  Still, it is useful to order them 
under a comprehensive framework—as the one offered by the types—
that allows for insightful evaluation of regulators’ manifold actions. 
As illustrated throughout, there are noticeable overlaps between the 
Guardian, Facilitator, and Technician types.  For one thing, the Guardian 
and the Technician are both execution-oriented.  For another, a 
substantial part of the work of both the Technician and the Facilitator is 
to furnish the ultimate decisionmaker (the President, the community, a 
commissioner, etc.) with credible information.  Above all, the three 
types are encumbered by human errors in processing information, 
subjected to bureaucratic constraints, and called to justify their 
(coercive) actions. 
Still, each type presents a different calibration and manifestation of 
these and other considerations.  For, bleed into each other as they do, 
each prototype imports a discrepant vision of agencies’ operational 
design; reflects dissimilar visions of the “public good”; envisages 
 
 294. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, 204-07. 
 295. Laski, supra note 2, at 106. 
 296. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 119. 
 297. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 114, at 185 (“Daily routine drives out planning.”). 
 298. Louis Jaffe, Judicial Review:  Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 275 (1955) (“The 
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that 
each agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law . . . .”). 
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divergent roles for stakeholders in the administrative process; and tends 
to revert to different enforcement tools.  Further, each of the three types 
of regulators responds to a different social need in a complex, industrial 
society.  Faced with a socio-economic difficulty, the Facilitator is a 
vehicle that facilitates public understanding of the situation at hand, but 
might stop short of actively resolving the difficulty.  The Guardian is 
asked to do more.  She should tell the public what should be done in the 
face of a social dilemma and outline programs for meeting objectives, 
which she sets.  The Technician is a lower-case executor.  She actually 
does the job on the ground, often dealing with the nuts and bolts of the 
program charted by the Guardian. 
The Article singled out and canvassed the three prototypes from a 
corpus produced by numerous students of public regulation, whose work 
spans most of the history of federal regulation.  The types’ very 
persistence and prevalence in theory and practice of regulation suggests 
that the types are fundamental in the American way of thinking on 
public administration.  It is therefore unlikely that the types will 
disappear in the foreseeable future.  Indeed, the analysis conducted in 
the Article gives us every reason to think they are here to stay. 
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